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GROUP AGENCY AND LEGAL PROOF; OR, WHY
THE JURY IS AN “IT”

MICHAEL S. PARDO*
ABSTRACT
Jurors decide whether certain facts have been proven according to
the applicable legal standards. What is the relationship between the
jury, as a collective decision-making body, on one hand, and the
views of individual jurors, on the other? Is the jury merely the sum
total of the individual views of its members? Or do juries possess
properties and characteristics of agency (for example, beliefs, knowledge, preferences, intentions, plans, and actions) that are in some
sense distinct from those of its members? This Article explores these
questions and defends a conception of the jury as a group agent with
agency that may differ from that of its members.
The Article then argues that this conception of the jury contains
important implications for law and legal proof. These implications
are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, recent
debates in evidence law have focused on whether legal proof is
probabilistic or explanatory in nature. These debates, however, have
largely assumed a single, unified fact-finder (whether jury or judge).
The group-level perspective reveals new conceptual problems for the
probabilistic theory that are alleviated by the explanatory theory; it
thus provides further vindication for the explanatory account. On the
practical side, the conception of the jury as a group agent, coupled
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Render, Larry Solum, Alex Stein, and Fred Vars. My thanks to Dean Mark Brandon and the
Alabama Law School Foundation for generous research support.
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with the explanatory account of proof, clarifies doctrinal issues on
whether, and when, jurors must agree on factual details. In both
criminal and civil cases, these issues have caused considerable confusion and uncertainty for courts and commentators.
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INTRODUCTION
A jury is a collection of individuals—each assesses evidence and
determines whether certain facts have been proven, according to the
applicable legal standards. The views of individual jurors are
aggregated, and if there is sufficient agreement, the jury’s group
decision will constitute a verdict.1 What is the relationship between
the jury as a collective decision-making body, on one hand, and the
beliefs, knowledge, intentions, preferences, and decisions of its
individual members, on the other? In other words, what is the
relationship between the jury as a potential “group agent” and the
agency of its members?2 Is there any coherent sense in which the
jury has group agency that differs from the agency of its members?
Or is the jury just a “they,” and not an “it?” What implications follow
from the answers to these questions?
These questions animate the discussions in this Article. I will
defend the view that the jury does indeed possess a type of group
agency that is distinct from the agency of its individual members.
In other words, I will argue that the jury is in fact an “it” (as well as
a “they”). Moreover, I will discuss several theoretical and practical
implications that follow from this conception of juries. Before outlining the details of the arguments to follow, I will first set the stage
by describing the distinct strands of scholarship that form the background for the discussion and upon which the analysis will draw.
There are five such strands. The first is a collection of “they, not
an it” arguments applied to collective decision-making bodies. For
1. The verdict may or may not result in a legal judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 59;
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Throughout this Article, “jury” refers to a petit
jury unless otherwise noted. The analysis will focus on the conclusions of petit juries at trial;
however, the analysis of group agency applies to grand juries as well.
2. “Agency” is a philosophical term of art. For purposes of this Article, an “agent” refers
to any entity with the power to act in response to its environment. The basics of agency include the capacities to: (1) represent or otherwise gather information about the environment
(for example, beliefs); (2) form motivational states about how the entity would like the environment to be (for example, desires, needs, intentions, plans); and (3) act to bring the environment into accord with the entity’s motivational states. See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT,
GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 20 (2011)
(articulating the basic conditions of agency); see also MICHAEL BRATMAN, STRUCTURES OF
AGENCY (2006); P.M.S. HACKER, HUMAN NATURE: THE CATEGORICAL FRAMEWORK 123 (2010)
(“An agent, in the most general sense of the term, is something that does something or acts.”).
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example, scholars frequently point out that Congress, the executive
branch, the White House, the judiciary, the Supreme Court, administrative agencies, corporations, boards of directors, the school board,
and so on, are a “they,” and not an “it.”3 There are a number of important truths—typically grounded in social-choice theory—contained in these arguments.4 Focusing on the “they” aspects draws
attention to the fact that any action taken by the collective body is
done through the actions of individuals who have distinct beliefs,
desires, preferences, intentions, and plans. This perspective exposes
some pernicious myths about collective decisions.5 However, an
extreme focus on the “they” aspects can obscure important aspects
in which groups can indeed display “it” characteristics.6
The second strand is recent philosophical work exploring the “it”
aspects of groups. A rich and sophisticated literature on “group
agency” has shown that the relationship between groups and individuals is not always a simple one.7 A group of individuals acting in
3. See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive
Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN. L. REV. 194 (2011); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress
Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992);
Cass A. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840 (2013) (“[T]he White House itself is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”); Adrian
Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division,
14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005).
4. For an excellent overview, see Christian List, Social Choice Theory, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 18, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-choice/ [http://perma.cc/
BH2P-LG59].
5. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 54-56 (2011) (discussing how the
“cycling” of preferences creates problems for law); Larry Alexander, The Objectivity of
Morality, Rules, and Law: A Conceptual Map, 65 ALA. L. REV. 501, 506 (2013) (“The collectivity problem is a real one. We might have rules about assigning meaning to otherwise
meaningless marks or sounds. But that meaning would not be one that the marks or sounds
by themselves expressed. There is no mind to make those marks or sounds into symbols that
convey a meaning.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48
(1983) (discussing how issues such as “agenda control” and “logrolling” make it impossible to
determine how a legislative body would vote on an issue it had not considered).
6. See generally Shepsle, supra note 3. It is not oxymoronic to speak of a group’s intentions. See JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION 43 (2010) (discussing “collective prior intentions and collective intentions-in-action”).
7. See, e.g., MARGARET GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT: HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD
(2014); MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS (1989) [hereinafter GILBERT, SOCIAL FACTS];
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD (1999); LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at
25-31; SEARLE, supra note 6, at 43-45. For scholarship exploring insights regarding group
agency for law and legal issues, see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011); Meir Dan-Cohen,
Epilogue on “Corporate Personhood” and Humanity, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 300 (2013); Lewis
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concert may come to possess properties that individuals in the group
do not. A legislature, a board of directors, a city council, an appellate
court, and (as this Article argues) a jury possess powers collectively
and can engage in certain actions collectively that no individual
members of that group can by themselves. For example, groups can
pass a law, adopt a mission statement, adopt a resolution, overrule
a prior precedent, or render a verdict. The relationships between
these groups and their members present a number of puzzling
possibilities: groups may engage in actions that no individuals in
the group want, and groups may endorse conclusions that no
individuals believe to be true; likewise, groups may fail to engage in
actions that all members of the group would prefer, and groups may
fail to endorse conclusions that all members believe to be true.8 The
idea of a group acting and believing in ways that deviate from the
actions and thoughts of its members has an air of mystery to it, as
though the group has emerged to take on a life—and a mind—of its
own. But the process is not mysterious, and groups are not magical
entities. Rather, the process is extraordinarily complex and this
complexity often obscures aspects of group decision making.
The third strand is a subset of the second. One topic within the
subject of group agency is “collective epistemology,” which explores
group knowledge and collective decision making on factual matters.9
The branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge—epistemology—has in recent years focused on so-called social epistemology,
which explores, among other issues, the extent to which various
social practices and institutions affect knowledge and true belief.10
A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial
Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Kornhauser & Sager, The One and the Many];
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986);
Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the
Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012); and Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against
Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013).
8. These possibilities are explained in more detail in Part I.
9. See generally COLLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY (Hans Bernhad Schmid et al. eds., 2011)
(discussing group epistemic judgments); Christian List, Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective, 2 EPISTEME 25 (2005) (discussing the “theory of
judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology”); Deborah Tollefsen, Group Testimony, 21 SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 299, 300 (2007) (“[T]he
testimony of a group is not necessarily the testimony of any particular member of the group
nor does group testimony necessarily express the views of some or all of the group members.”).
10. GOLDMAN, supra note 7, at 4-7. See generally SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY: ESSENTIAL
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A key topic in social epistemology is when, and under what conditions, groups possess knowledge or other epistemic states.
The fourth and fifth strands focus on law, legal proof, and juries.
The fourth strand concerns the academic literature on the process
of legal proof and its conceptual components. The primary theoretical debate in recent years has focused on whether to conceptualize
this process in probabilistic or explanatory terms.11 Under one conception, the process of proof involves explicitly probabilistic conclusions by jurors and judges on the formal elements of crimes, civil
causes of action, or affirmative defenses; under the alternative conception, jurors and judges evaluate competing possible explanations
of the evidence and disputed events.
The fifth strand concerns the scholarly literature on difficult
doctrinal issues: On what exactly must jurors agree to constitute a
verdict?12 For example, must jurors only agree on whether a defendant committed a particular crime, or must they also agree on a
particular factual scenario, theory, or means by which the defendant
committed the crime? When are juror disagreements acceptable, and
when do they undermine verdicts?
This Article will draw upon the first three strands of scholarship
to present a conception of the jury as an “it” (as well as a “they”).
READINGS (Alvin Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb, eds., 2011) (discussing social epistemology
in five sections: defining social epistemology, trust in testimony and experts, reasonable peer
disagreement, judgment aggregation, and social-system design).
11. For an overview of the debates, see Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of
Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547 (2013). On the probabilistic conception, see, for example, Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254 (2013); and
Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977). On the explanatory
conception, see Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical
Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2007); and Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen,
Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223 (2008).
12. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, Jury Fact-Finding in Criminal Cases: Constitutional Limits
on Factual Disagreements Among Convicting Jurors, 58 MO. L. REV. 1 (1993); Jessica A. Roth,
Alternative Elements, 59 UCLA L. REV. 170 (2011); Hayden J. Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts,
Different-Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury Theory: Whether Verdicts are Invalidated by
Juror Disagreement on Issues, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 473 (1983); Peter Westen & Eric Ow,
Reaching Agreement on When Jurors Must Agree, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 153 (2007); Brian
Bah, Note, Jury Unanimity and the Problem with Specificity: Trying to Understand What
Jurors Must Agree About by Examining the Problem of Prosecuting Child Molesters, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 1203 (2013); Elizabeth A. Larsen, Comment, Specificity and Juror Agreement in Civil
Cases, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 379 (2002); Stephen E. Sachs, Alternative Theories of the Crime
(May 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/4MGE-K3AJ.
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The Article will then argue that this conception contains
implications for the fourth and fifth strands. In particular, this
conception will vindicate the explanatory conception of proof and, in
the process, clarify the practical doctrinal issues regarding juror
agreement.
Part I provides a general overview of group agency. This Part
specifies the basic requirements for a group to act as an agent, clarifies the relationship between the agency of a group and the agency
of its individual members, and explains why a group can exhibit
characteristics of agency that deviate from the agency of its members. The basics of group agency depend on whether the group faces
choices, can assess evidence and make judgments about its options
on the choices, and has the power to choose between its options. The
relationship between groups and individuals is complex. Although
group agency depends upon, and is fixed by, the agency of individuals, the agency of individuals may be aggregated in a variety of
different ways. These differences provide the mechanisms by which
group agency may differ from the individuals on which it depends.
Part I is devoted to unpacking these notions.
Building on Part I, Part II provides a general overview of group
knowledge. This Part articulates a basic account of group epistemic
judgments, which parallels individual epistemic judgments. Just
like individuals, groups may endorse or accept certain propositions
as true. And, just like individuals, sometimes these conclusions will
be true and warranted by the evidence, and sometimes they will
be false or unsupported by the evidence. This Part also explores
reasons why group epistemic judgments may deviate from the epistemic conditions of its individual members: a group may know
things its members do not, and members may know things the
group fails to know.
Part III applies the analysis in Parts I and II to the jury. It provides an account of juries as group epistemic agents. As with group
agency generally, a jury may arrive at conclusions that differ from
the conclusions and beliefs of its members, depending on the
applicable aggregation rules. In the jury context, these rules include
the variety of procedural rules that specify the size of juries and the
number of votes required for a verdict. This Part illustrates how,
because of these rules, juries may endorse conclusions that all or
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most jurors reject, and juries may fail to endorse conclusions every
juror accepts. This Part also explores how other epistemic components arise in the institutional context of jury fact-finding. For
example, the jury may be epistemically justified in arriving at a
particular conclusion, even though individual jurors are not, and
jurors may be justified in reaching conclusions even though the jury
is not. This Part establishes why the jury is an “it.”
Parts IV and V discuss implications for this conception of the jury.
Part IV explores two theoretical accounts of legal proof—probabilistic and explanatory—at the level of group agency. These general
accounts offer ways to conceptualize aspects of the proof process,
including the value of evidence, the meaning of standards of proof,
and the nature of juror inferences from evidence.13 After outlining
these two accounts, this Part will argue that at the level of group
agency, the probabilistic account faces several conceptual problems.
These problems include acceptance by the probabilistic conception
of: (1) jury outcomes that all jurors reject; (2) outcomes that do not
track the strength of the evidence (for example, parties with worse
cases may win, even though their counterparts with stronger cases
do not); and (3) juror disagreements that undermine verdicts.
The explanatory conception is shown to alleviate or avoid these
problems. The discussion in this Part draws on a conceptual problem already explored extensively in the literature—the so-called
conjunction paradox—that focuses on a single or unified decision
maker.14 This problem is seen as a major obstacle to the probabilistic conception because it reveals a fundamental disconnect between
legal outcomes and elementary probability theory.15 Moving to the
group level reveals new problems, which are related to, but distinct
from, the original conjunction problem. The upshot of this Part is
that shifting to a group-agency perspective provides additional
13. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 574-612.
14. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 58-61 (1977) (introducing
the conjunction problem to discussions of legal proof); Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence,
Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 562 (2013) (referring to the
“conjunction paradox” as “the most difficult ... [problem], in the eyes of many” facing a
probabilistic conception of proof).
15. See Cheng, supra note 11, at 1256-59 (arguing that the conjunction paradox is a
significant obstacle to trial by mathematics and proposing adjustments to the conventional
understanding of the probabilistic account); Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99
MICH. L. REV. 723, 723 (2001) (noting the “math-law divide” on this issue).
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support for an explanatory conception of proof (and a rejection of a
probabilistic conception).
Building on the theoretical analysis in Part IV, Part V explores
the practical implications. The account of the jury as a group agent,
coupled with the explanatory conception of proof, clarifies an important doctrinal issue beleaguering courts and commentators. Namely,
on what exactly must jurors agree in civil and criminal cases? Need
they agree only on whether the formal elements of a crime or civil
claim have been proven (the “formal elements” approach), or must
they also agree on a particular factual scenario, theory, or means
(the “single theory” approach)? The probabilistic account presupposes the formal elements approach and thus accepts significant
disagreements by jurors on factual details, even when these disagreements undermine verdicts. The explanatory account rejects both
the formal elements and single theory approaches. This Part argues
that jurors must agree on an explanation of the evidence and events,
consistent with the applicable standard of proof. Therefore, the
formal elements approach (presupposed by the probabilistic conception) requires too little agreement.16 Jurors may, however, agree on
alternative (or disjunctive) explanations under certain conditions,
and thus the single theory approach sometimes requires too much
agreement.17 The discussion clarifies when disagreements are acceptable and when they undermine verdicts.
Part VI considers and rejects possible counterarguments, and a
brief conclusion considers broader possible implications for the
analysis.

16. See, e.g., Stoner v. Williams, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 252 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[W]e conclude
that jurors need not agree from among a number of alternative acts which act is proved, so
long as the jurors agree that each element of the cause of action is proved.”). The Supreme
Court rejected a formal elements approach in criminal cases. Richardson v. United States, 526
U.S. 813, 815 (1999). The proper agreement test, however, is still a matter of controversy.
Even more uncertainty exists in civil cases. See Larsen, supra note 12, at 388-92.
17. See, e.g., Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 265-66 (Ct. App.
1999) (upholding special verdict form requiring jurors to agree on which specific act by
defendant constituted negligence). The Supreme Court in Schad v. Arizona rejected a
categorical single theory approach, recognizing that “alternative means” may (sometimes) be
acceptable grounds for a verdict, but, again, considerable uncertainty remains. 501 U.S. 624,
645 (1991).
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I. GROUP AGENCY: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
What does it mean for a group to exhibit agency? In other words,
when does a collection of individuals work together in such a way
that they manifest not just individual beliefs, judgments, preferences, intentions, plans, decisions, and actions, but also collective
beliefs, judgments, preferences, intentions, plans, decisions, and actions?18 What is the relationship between the agency of individuals
in a group and the agency of the group itself ? Can there even be
such a thing as the group’s agency that is distinct from just the sum
of the individual agency of its members? These general inquiries
arise within a rich literature examining collective decision making,
drawing on several academic disciplines, including philosophy, economics, political science, psychology, sociology, and mathematics.19
In discussing recent literature on group agency, this Part has
three goals: first, to explain what it means for a group to exhibit
agency; second, to clarify some conceptual issues regarding group
agency; and, third, to illustrate why, and in what sense, a group
agent may exhibit agency that deviates from the agency of its
individual members. This overview will lay the groundwork for Part
II’s subsequent discussion of group knowledge. Part III will then
apply the insights from Parts I and II to the jury.
To illustrate group agency, let us start with a simple example.
Suppose a three-judge appellate panel (Judges Black, Gray, and
White) is voting on whether to affirm or to reverse a district court
judgment granting summary judgment. If all three judges vote to
affirm the district court judgment, then the appellate court’s
decision will have the effect of affirming the district court’s judgment. The same is true if two appellate judges vote to affirm. But
if two vote to reverse and one votes to affirm, then the judgment
will be reversed. The court can do something through the actions
of the panel that no one judge can do by himself or herself. This
basic truth about appellate courts extends to groups of many
different varieties. Through the actions of its members, the group
may come to act like an agent in ways that are similar to the actions
18. See supra note 2.
19. For an overview, see List, supra note 4.
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of individuals. In an illuminating recent work, Christian List and
Philip Pettit argue that a group exhibits agency (and concomitantly
may be held responsible qua agent) when three conditions are met:
(1) the group faces normatively significant choices;
(2) it understands its options and has access to evidence for making judgments about its options; and
(3) it has the control required for choosing between options.20

These three conditions are certainly true of the appellate panel, and
they are true for a host of other groups such as an administrative
agency, a board deciding whether to fund a research study, or a
charity deciding how to allocate donations.
Once we recognize that groups may exhibit agency in this sense,
the next question is how best to conceptualize or model this agency.
According to one collection of views—which is sometimes labeled
“summative” or “eliminative”21—a group’s agency is just the sum
total of the agency of individuals in the group and nothing more.
In other words, the group’s choices are nothing more than the
choices of the individuals in the group, the group’s beliefs are the
collection of beliefs of the individuals, and the group’s judgments
are the judgments made by the individuals in the group. Under an
alternative view—which is sometimes labeled “non-summative” or
“emergent”22 —the group’s agency may deviate from the beliefs,
20. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at 158.
21. See GILBERT, SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 7, at 19; LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at 73.
In addition to these labels, other related terms include “reductive,” “individualist,” and “singularism.” Gilbert also uses the term “correlative” to refer to the position that for a group to
have a particular attitude (for example a belief), at least one member must share that
attitude. See GILBERT, SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 7, at 19. I use the label “summative” to encompass any view that denies there is actual group agency.
22. See GILBERT, SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 7, at 19. For more information on the “emergentist” tradition in history, sociology, and political theory in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, see LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at 73. They explain that the emergentists “held that group agents emerge as new phenomena over and above the individuals
constituting them.” Id. By contrast, the eliminativist tradition, associated with analytic
philosophy and economics, “held that group agents can be eliminated from any serious
inventory of the world.” Id. They explain: “If the emergentist tradition reified and mystified
group agents, hailing them like transcendent realities, the eliminativist tradition went to the
other extreme” in claiming that groups are fictions. Id. at 74. These extreme positions also
form poles along a continuum in contemporary political science. See Christian List & Kai
Spiekermann, Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation,
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judgments, choices, preferences, and other aspects of the agency of
its individual members. In other words, the judgments (or other
aspects of agency) of the individual members on an issue may be
neither necessary nor sufficient to fix the judgment (or other aspects
of agency) for the group.23 At first blush, the non-summative model
may seem mysterious, but it is demonstrably true.
Consider again our appellate panel deciding whether to affirm
or reverse a summary judgment. Suppose the summary judgment
issue is based on two underlying issues: (1) the admissibility of a
plaintiff ’s expert (Admissibility), and (2) whether the plaintiff ’s
evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment (Sufficiency).
Suppose when they vote, Judges Black and Gray vote to affirm, and
Judge White votes to reverse. The court thus affirms. But suppose
each judge concluded as follows:
BLACK: It was an abuse of discretion to exclude the expert, but
even with the expert, the plaintiff ’s evidence is still insufficient
to survive summary judgment. Therefore, I vote to affirm.
GRAY: It was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the expert,
and without the expert, the plaintiff ’s evidence is insufficient
(but it would be sufficient if the evidence were admitted).24
Therefore, I vote to affirm.
WHITE: The expert should have been admitted, and it was an
abuse of discretion to exclude it. With the expert (but not
without it), the plaintiff ’s evidence is sufficient to survive
summary judgment. Therefore, I vote to reverse.

If we sum the individual views of the judges, notice now what we
have: a majority of the judges (White and Black) concludes that the
district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert, and
a majority of the judges (White and Gray) concludes that the plaintiff ’s evidence with the expert is sufficient to survive summary judgment. This is an example of what Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence
107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 629, 629-31 (2013).
23. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at 77 (“[I]ndividual attitudes on some conclusion ... may
be not only insufficient but even unnecessary for determining the group attitude on it. Thus
a relatively simple set of group attitudes can result from a vast and complex variety of
individual sets of attitudes.”).
24. Judge Gray might even think that she would have admitted the evidence were she
trying the case.
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Sager refer to as the “doctrinal paradox,” and it is a well-known
problem that potentially arises in any appellate case with more than
one issue.25 The key insight is that the group’s conclusion changes
depending on whether the appeal is decided as a whole (defendant
wins) or subissue by subissue (plaintiff wins).26
This phenomenon is not limited to doctrinal or legal issues. It
generalizes readily to any set of related or logically connected propositions.27 Consider, for example, a group of three friends deciding on
a restaurant at which to meet for dinner. Two of the three, Able and
Baker, are hungry and want to meet at a restaurant where there
will not be a wait for a table. The third friend, Charlie, does not care
whether they will have to wait for a table. Able proposes they meet
at Harmony Grill and gives reasons why it is unlikely to be crowded.
Baker disagrees with these reasons and argues instead that they
will have to wait at Harmony Grill. Charlie loves the food at Harmony Grill. Moreover, he thinks Baker is right, and they will have
to wait but he wants to go anyway. Will they go to Harmony Grill?
Well, it depends. Assuming they agree to a majority vote, the
answer will depend on whether they decide based on the overall
conclusion or whether they decide proposition by proposition. If they
vote on the issue of going to Harmony Grill, then a majority will
vote yes (Able and Charlie), and so they will go there. Instead, they
could vote on two propositions: (1) will there be a wait at Harmony
Grill?, and (2) should we go somewhere without a wait? In this instance, a majority will reject Harmony Grill because two friends will
accept the first position that there will be a wait (Baker and
Charlie), and two will accept the conditional, second proposition
that the friends should go somewhere without a wait (Able and
Baker). List and Pettit refer to this more general phenomenon as

25. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The Many as One: Integrity and Group
Choice in Paradoxical Cases, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249, 250-51 (2004); Kornhauser & Sager,
The One and the Many, supra note 7, at 2-3. Jon Elster notes a similar paradox involving jury
voting as described by the nineteenth-century mathematician Poisson. JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 62-63 (2013).
26. With regard to multimember courts, Kornhauser and Sager favor a “meta-rule” that
allows each court to determine for itself whether to proceed by voting issue-by-issue or on the
ultimate conclusion. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 25, at 268 & n.12.
27. Propositions are related in this sense if the truth of one proposition has some bearing
on the truth of another.
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the “discursive dilemma,” and it potentially arises for any set of
logically related propositions.28
There are a number of interesting aspects to the discursive dilemma,29 but for the purposes of this Article, what is most important is
the fact that a group’s judgment on whether a factual proposition is
true may deviate from the judgments of a majority of individuals on
that same proposition. A group may judge a proposition to be true
that a majority of individuals in the group believes to be false, and
a group may judge a proposition to be false that a majority in the
group believe to be true. We can see from these examples that a
group’s judgments depend not merely on the judgments of the
individuals—they also depend on how those individual judgments
are aggregated. The process, procedure, or mechanism—more generally, the “aggregation function”30—also determines what a group
believes, judges, and decides, and how the group acts. Even when
individual judgments remain constant, different aggregation functions produce different group outcomes. The outcomes in the two
examples above change depending on whether the decision is
conclusion-based or decided on a premise-by-premise basis, yet
the individual beliefs remain the same. The conclusion-based versus premise-by-premise issue is just one of a staggering number of
differing aggregation functions that may produce different group
results.31 For another example, consider unanimous voting. Under
such a procedure, any of the three judges or any of the three
friends in the above examples could block an outcome on which
28. See Christian List & Philip Pettit, On the Many as One: A Reply to Kornhauser and
Sager, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 378, 380-81 (2005).
29. The “discursive dilemma” is one aspect of formal work by List and Pettit leading to
their “impossibility theorem” for aggregation judgments. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at 4250. According to the theorem, no aggregation procedure can guarantee “complete and consistent” collective judgments and also meet three conditions: (1) “universal domain” (it works for
any combination of judgments); (2) “anonymity” (voters have equal weight—there are no
dictators, favored voters, or anyone with tie-breaking power); and (3) “systematicity” (each
proposition is treated equally). Id. As with the discursive dilemma, List and Pettit suggest
that one way out of the formal impossibility limitations is to prioritize some issues over
others. Id. at 56-58. This impossibility theorem is distinct from the famous one formulated by
Kenneth Arrow. See Christian List & Philip Pettit, Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared, 140 SYNTHESE 207, 209 (2004).
30. The aggregation function converts individual attitudes to group attitudes. LIST &
PETTIT, supra note 2, at 48.
31. For example, when voting on a single proposition, “a 10-member group already has
a choice between ... 21024 ... possible aggregation functions.” Id. at 49.
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they disagree, even when the other two are in complete agreement
on both the outcomes and the individual premises. The upshot is
that group agency depends on a combination of individual agency
and aggregation functions, and not individual agency by itself. This
basic fact demonstrates that group agency depends on more than
individual agency and that a group’s agency may possess features
that deviate from those of its members.
What then is the relationship between group and individual agency? The general relationship can be clarified with an incredibly
useful piece of philosophical jargon: “supervenience.”32 A group’s
judgment supervenes on the combination of individual judgments
and the aggregation function. This property of supervenience explains why a group can experience agency that differs from the
agency of its individuals, and it also explains why group agency can
emerge in an unmysterious, metaphysically plausible fashion. To
illustrate this property at work, consider the following example.33
Imagine thousands of tiny green circles arranged in such a fashion
that they form one large green square. From a few feet away, suppose that all you see is what looks like a large green square, but
when you get closer you see that the square is in fact made of tiny
circles. In this case, the square supervenes on the circles.
Notice several facts about this relationship. First, once the circles were fixed in their current position, a square would necessarily
emerge. Second, none of the circles is itself square—the larger shape
thus has properties its individuals components do not. Third, the
square is just the combination of the circles and their arrangement,
even though the square has properties the circles do not. Fourth, for
the square to emerge, it was not necessary that any specific circle be
in its exact location. Each dot could have taken a different position
in the arrangement and a similar-looking square would still have
emerged, so long as the arrangement was the same. Fifth, the
square is “multiply realizable” in another sense.34 The square need
32. See Brian McLaughlin & Karen Bennett, Supervenience, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/ [http://perma.cc/AY9Q-2K3N]
(“A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ
with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. In slogan
form, ‘there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference.’”)
33. See LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at 65.
34. John Bickle, Multiple Realizability, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ [http://perma.cc/XQZ6-CHFP] (“In the
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not have been made out of circles at all. It could have been made of
smaller squares, or triangles, or any other shape. In other words,
the arrangement of small circles is just one way such a square can
be realized or created, and it can be done in other ways as well. The
idea of multiply realizable supervenience is best known as a possible
explanation of the relationship between the mind and the brain.35
But supervenience also explains the relationship between group and
individual agency.
Because of this relationship, given a fixed set of individual judgments and a fixed aggregation function, a group judgment may
emerge. Notice it may emerge—a group judgment may also fail to
emerge. This failure may occur for a variety of different reasons.
Even when a group has a fixed aggregation function, a group judgment will fail to emerge when the individual judgments fail to
satisfy the aggregation requirements. For example, a unanimity
requirement will prevent a group from expressing a judgment when
the individuals fail to reach a unanimous decision. Similarly, a
group with fixed individual judgments may not have a fixed aggregation function, and so there may be no group judgment that can be
said to emerge from the individual decisions. Or a group may recognize several different aggregation functions that produce a cacophony of inconsistent judgments, such that we cannot recognize any
one of them as the group’s judgment. In short, there is nothing that
guarantees a group—even a group with a clear, stable, well-recognized aggregation function—will produce a group judgment, or
otherwise exhibit group agency. Like the green square, it takes the
right sort of components, arranged in the right sort of way, for
emergence to occur.
When group agency emerges, however, it shares similar characteristics with other supervenient relationships. First, when a group
judgment emerges, it necessarily arises from the individual judgments and the aggregation function.36 Second, the group judgment
philosophy of mind, the multiple realizability thesis contends that a single mental kind
(property, state, event) can be realized by many distinct physical kinds.”).
35. For example, over twenty years ago, Jaegwon Kim wrote, “It is part of today’s conventional wisdom in philosophy of mind that psychological states are ‘multiply realizable’, and
are in fact so realized, in a variety of structures and organisms.” Jaegwon Kim, Multiple
Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1, 1
(1992). These debates rage on. See Bickle, supra note 34.
36. Because group conclusions on individual premises may differ from individual conclu-
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may possess properties or features that the individual judgments
lack. Third, the group judgment is just the combination of the individual judgments and the aggregation function—there is nothing
more mysterious going on metaphysically. Fourth, the individual
components that produce a group judgment may be interchangeable.
It does not matter which two judges on a three-judge panel vote one
way (any two will do). Finally, the group’s judgment may be multiply realizable. Different combinations of individuals and judgments,
combined in a variety of different ways, may produce the same
group judgment.
II. GROUP KNOWLEDGE: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
Within the larger topic of group agency, an essential component
involves epistemic judgments by groups. These judgments concern
conclusions, based on the available information, about whether
propositions are true or false, or likely to be true or false. We can
distinguish a group’s epistemic judgments from its mere preferences
on the ground that the group is the ultimate authority with regard
to the latter, but not the former.37 With epistemic judgments, there
is something external to the group about which the group can be
right or wrong.
For individuals as well as groups, the relationship between
knowledge and agency is tight and integral. Individuals who know
things can do things they could not otherwise do, and they can do
things better than agents who do not know what they know.38 These
sions on those premises, the type of supervenience between groups and individuals is “holistic” (that is, group judgments supervene on sets of individual judgments as a whole), rather
than proposition-based supervenience. For a discussion of the possible types of supervenience
relations, see LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at 71-72.
37. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 25, at 257-58 (distinguishing preferences from
judgments).
38. Knowledge falls into two types: knowing how to do something and knowing that
something is so (in other words, a proposition is true), although the two types are related. See
GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 25-61 (1949) (distinguishing knowing how and knowing
that). This Part will focus on articulating propositional knowledge (knowledge that). For both
types, however, knowledge is valuable. There is philosophical debate about whether there is
anything intrinsically valuable about knowledge per se, as opposed to pragmatic value
because of its connection to truth, justification, and other epistemic virtues. See JONATHAN
L. KVANVIG, THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PURSUIT OF UNDERSTANDING (2003). But the
basic point about knowledge typically being a good thing should be uncontroversial. If not, ask
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truisms apply to groups as well. Consider again List and Pettit’s
conditions for group agency:
(1) the group faces normatively significant choices;
(2) it understands its options and has access to evidence for making judgments about its options; and
(3) it has the control required for choosing between options.39

Knowledge plays an important role at each step. Knowledge is important for recognizing the choices being faced, understanding the
options available, accessing and evaluating the evidence relevant to
those options, and exercising control in executing the chosen course
of action.
The topic of knowledge (and related issues) falls within the
philosophical domain of epistemology. Traditionally, epistemology
focused primarily on individual agents as potential knowers, with
philosophers exploring questions such as the nature of knowledge
and its foundations, the nature of justified belief, and possible responses to a variety of skeptical challenges.40 Although these issues
remain staples in the literature, the field has expanded in recent
decades to also focus on what has come to be labeled as “social
epistemology.”41 The issues in social epistemology concern how various social practices affect knowledge and true belief—for example,
how processes such as testimony function as a source of knowledge,42 and how various institutions—such as democracy, science,
education, and legal trials—may promote or thwart knowledge
acquisition and retention.43 Within social epistemology, one important issue concerns group knowledge (or “collective epistemology”).44
yourself whether you would prefer an operation to be performed on you by a doctor who knows
how to perform the operation or one who does not.
39. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at 158.
40. For an excellent overview of the field, see A COMPANION TO EPISTEMOLOGY (Jonathan
Dancy & Ernest Sosa, eds., 2000).
41. See Alvin I. Goldman, A Guide to Social Epistemology, in SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY:
ESSENTIAL READINGS, supra note 10, at 11, 11-13. See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 7.
42. See, e.g., JENNIFER LACKEY, LEARNING FROM WORDS: TESTIMONY AS A SOURCE OF
KNOWLEDGE (2008).
43. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 7.
44. See Jennifer Lackey, Group Knowledge Attributions, in KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS 243,
245 (Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken eds., 2012) (“[W]e do in fact attribute knowledge to
groups and ... we do so systematically and in a widespread fashion.”).
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We can get a better understanding of the contours of group
knowledge by first focusing on what it means for an individual to
know something. The first distinction to note is the difference
between knowing how to do something and knowing that something,
such as a proposition, is true. Although the two senses of knowledge
are related, propositional knowledge (or knowledge-that) will be the
primary focus of this Article.
But what does it mean for someone to know a proposition? Three
basic components are prominent in accounts of knowledge: belief,
truth, and justification.45 The discussion below proceeds by first outlining the basic components and how they apply to groups; second,
explaining some additional features of knowledge in general; and
finally, clarifying the features of group knowledge that make it a
distinct phenomenon.
The first basic component of knowledge is belief. In the individual
case, to know something typically requires that the agent believes
(or otherwise accepts or endorses) the proposition to be true. In
short, in knowing X, the person judges X to be true. Depending on
how one characterizes “belief,” it may be controversial to ascribe
actual beliefs to a group.46 For our purposes, however, the fact that
the group accepts, judges, or otherwise endorses a proposition to be
true is sufficient to satisfy this requirement. In other words, for a
group to know X, the group must somehow endorse X. The group
must take the proposition to be true based on whatever aggregation
function operates for the group. Group agents, like individual
agents, may form judgments about whether a proposition is true or
false, and these judgments may or may not be true.
The second basic component is truth. For the individual case,
an agent’s knowledge of X requires that X be true. The exact
same requirement applies for group judgments. This requirement—that knowledge implies truth—is characterized as the

45. Although, for reasons explored below, these components are not jointly sufficient.
46. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 547 (denying groups have beliefs); Shepsle,
supra note 3, at 254 (denying groups have beliefs). But see GILBERT, SOCIAL FACTS, supra note
7; LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2; SEARLE, supra note 6.
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“factive” component of knowledge.47 It is a general condition, and it
arises no matter who, or what, is doing the knowing.
The third basic component is epistemic justification. The exact
nature and contours of epistemic justification is a source of considerable philosophical debate. The epistemic support necessary for
justification has been articulated in a number of different ways,
including the quality and quantity of the evidence for the proposition, the reasons the agent has for believing it, or the reliability of
the process that produced the belief or judgment.48 Details of the
internecine philosophical debates do not matter for purposes of this
Article. The basic idea, sufficient for our purposes, is that for an
individual agent’s true belief to constitute knowledge, there must
also be some type of reason, evidence, warrant, or other epistemic
support for it. In other words, knowledge presupposes that there is
some nonaccidental connection between the belief and its truth.
Lucky guesses, or true beliefs without any reasons for them, that
just happen to be true, are not knowledge.49 The justification
requirement applies for group judgments just as it does for individuals. For a group to know a proposition, the group must have the
requisite evidence, reasons, or reliability.
In sum, we can articulate a basic account of group knowledge
that parallels individual knowledge with regard to the components
of justified true beliefs.50 However, the parallels run deeper still.
A major breakthrough in contemporary philosophy was Edmund
Gettier’s seminal paper, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,
which demonstrates that having a justified true belief may not be

47. “To know” is a factive verb in the sense that what is known must be true. See Goldman, supra note 41, at 42 (“To know a proposition p is to know that it is true. But you cannot
know that p is true unless it is true.”). Other verbs with factive senses include “to perceive”
and “to remember.”
48. A key distinction in the field is whether epistemic justification is an “internal” notion
(that is, internal to an agent’s mental states or at least available to the agent) or an “external”
one that depends solely on whether a belief was formed via a reliable process. For an informative recent survey and discussion of the internal-external debate in epistemology, see
CLAYTON LITTLEJOHN, JUSTIFICATION AND THE TRUTH-CONNECTION 1-61 (2012).
49. See generally DUNCAN PRITCHARD, EPISTEMIC LUCK (2005) (distinguishing different
types of luck and their relationship to issues in epistemology).
50. See GILBERT, SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 7, at 313 (“If there is a plausible concept of
[group] knowledge, it will presumably parallel the concept of an individual person’s knowledge.”).
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sufficient to constitute knowledge.51 Although the exact significance
of Gettier’s demonstration remains a matter of philosophical debate,
one implication is that knowledge also requires an appropriate
connection between the justification conditions (or the evidence that
supports a belief ) and its truth. In other words, a well-supported
belief that just happens to be true because of reasons other than
those that appear to support the belief may not qualify as knowledge. Here are two simple examples.52 First, suppose Smith checks
his generally reliable wall clock, which displays the time as 8:29.
And it is 8:29. However, the clock stopped at 8:29 last night. Smith
does not know it is 8:29.53 Second, suppose Jones looks out her
window and sees what she thinks is a deer on her lawn. She is
wrong. What she observes is a cleverly disguised dog that looks like
a deer. However, there is a deer on her lawn, hiding behind some
bushes. Jones does not know there is a deer on her lawn.54 The
beliefs of both Smith and Jones are based on misleading evidence.
The reliability of the clock, on one hand, and the disguised dog, on
the other, are in an important sense unrelated to the truth of the
beliefs—they have nothing to do with why the beliefs are true
(although they caused the beliefs).55 This sort of accidental or
coincidental connection between justification and truth can undermine claims to knowledge. Knowledge is “nonaccidentally true
belief,” with extensive discussion in epistemology trying to determine exactly what “nonaccidentally” means.56 The Gettier problem
applies to groups, just as it does to individuals.

51. Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963); see
also TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHILOSOPHY 179 (2007) (referring to Gettier’s
article as the “canonical example in the literature on philosophical thought experiments”).
52. Gettier’s original examples involved hypothetical agents who inferred true conclusions
from false (but justified) premises. See generally Gettier, supra note 51. The same gap
between truth and justification also potentially arises for perceptual beliefs. See Alvin I.
Goldman, Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge, 73 J. PHIL. 771 (1976).
53. See ISRAEL SCHEFFLER, CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 4, 22-24 (1965); William G. Lycan,
On the Gettier Problem Problem, in EPISTEMOLOGY FUTURES 148, 154 (Stephen Hetherington
ed., 2006).
54. RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 107-08 (1966) (discussing the
“problem of truth”); Lycan, supra note 53, at 154.
55. Even true beliefs formed by correctly perceiving the true state of affairs can be subject
to Gettier conditions. For a discussion and examples, see Goldman, supra note 52.
56. See generally PRITCHARD, supra note 49.
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The deep parallel between group and individual knowledge also
extends to related epistemic concepts. Two such concepts are the
“sensitivity” and “safety” of judgments.57 A true judgment is “sensitive” to the degree that the agent would not make the same judgment in conditions in which it is false.58 A true judgment is “safe”
when it could not easily have been false, and the agent still judged
it to be true.59 Philosophers have used these concepts to illustrate
aspects of justification and knowledge—the more insensitive or unsafe a true judgment, the less likely it constitutes knowledge or is
epistemically justified.60 As with the other philosophical concepts
discussed above, the exact relationships between safety, sensitivity,
knowledge, and justification remain a source of debate, but whatever the underlying details, the topics of sensitivity and safety apply
to group judgments just as they do to individual judgments.
Along with these parallels, it is also important to note conceptual
details that apply to group knowledge only, and not to individual
cases. Group knowledge—as with group agency generally—is nonsummative in nature.61 In other words, what a group knows is not
merely the sum of what the individual members know. This nonsummative aspect has two important implications for our purposes.
First, a group may fail to know something even when individuals
in the group do in fact know that proposition.62 For example, suppose a group has a unanimous aggregation procedure for purposes
of group action that requires every member to judge X to be true for
the group to judge that X is true. Suppose there is good evidence
for X. X is true, and every member in the group except one member judges X to be true. The group would fail to know X, even
though every member of the group except one member knows X.
Second, a group may know something even when no member in the
group knows that proposition.63 This might occur when relevant
57. See Duncan Pritchard, Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SKEPTICISM (John Greco ed., 2011).
58. In other words, a true judgment is insensitive when the individual would reach the
same judgment even when it is false.
59. In other words, a true judgment is unsafe when it could easily have been false and the
individual would still believe it.
60. See generally Pritchard, supra note 57.
61. See GILBERT, SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 7, at 19.
62. Id. at 20.
63. See Lackey, supra note 44, at 248.
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information is distributed among members in a group such that no
one member is aware of all of it. In such a case, an external observer
may still be able to ascribe knowledge to the collective group. For
example, imagine a group of scientists with different areas of
expertise, and with access to different data, working on a team
project. Their combined work may produce knowledge that exceeds
the knowledge of any individuals.64
As with the general account of group agency,65 what matters for
group knowledge are the epistemic states of individual members
and the applicable aggregation function. This combination determines which propositions a group endorses as true (and is prepared
to act upon). Whether these judgments are knowledge depends on
whether they are in fact true, epistemically justified, and subject to
Gettier conditions.
III. THE JURY AS GROUP AGENT
Juries are group agents. More specifically, they are group epistemic agents. In other words, juries are collective decision-making
bodies that make epistemic judgments. These judgments take the
form of conclusions on whether, based on the evidence presented,
particular propositions—namely, the elements of crimes, civil causes
of action, and affirmative defenses—have been proven to a particular standard of proof. These collective epistemic decisions by juries
require coordinated group action, and these acts produce significant
consequences. When juries exercise their collective agency in certain
ways, the government may legally deprive parties of life, liberty, or
property; declare that certain rights have been violated and remedy
these violations; or declare with the force of law that defendants are
not criminally or civilly liable. When jurors fail to exercise their
collective agency in the right ways, the jury fails to act. These
failures may occur because (1) the individual conclusions of the
jurors do not satisfy the aggregation rules that produce a group
conclusion,66 or (2) the epistemic foundation underlying the group’s
64. For additional examples, see id. at 248-50.
65. See supra Part I.
66. In which case, the result may be a mistrial because of a hung jury. Juror conclusions
also often involve normative evaluations and considerations. See generally Ronald J. Allen &
Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003);
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conclusion is inadequate (that is, the evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict).67
Through the actions of individual jurors, juries engage in
collective decision making and thus function as group epistemic
agents. This Part provides an account of jury agency. It argues that
jury agency is non-summative in nature (in other words, juries are
“its” in addition to “theys”), and it then explains the collective
epistemology underlying the jury’s non-summative agency.
A. Why Jury Agency Is Non-Summative
Juries decide whether particular propositions have been proven
by the party with the burden of proof.68 The propositions are the
individual elements of a crime or civil cause of action. Moreover, if
the defendant raises an affirmative defense, then the jury may also
render a judgment on the individual elements of the defense. A
standard of proof applies to each element, on which one party or the
other will have the burden of proof. The three common standards
are “beyond a reasonable doubt,”69 “preponderance of the evidence,”70 and, to a lesser degree, “clear and convincing evidence.”71
Youngjae Lee, Reasonable Doubt and Moral Elements, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming 2015). Even when jurors agree on the basics about “what happened,” they may
disagree about how best to characterize those facts and thus fail to satisfy the applicable
aggregation rules for that reason.
67. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50 (2000)
(explaining that the standard for judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” the standard for
summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986)
(explaining the summary judgment standard as whether “a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party” and that this determination depends on the “evidentiary
standard of proof ” at trial) (emphasis added); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-18 (1979)
(articulating the sufficiency standard in criminal cases as whether any “rational trier of fact
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” when evaluating the jury’s conclusion).
68. The burden of proof is composed of two elements: a production burden and a
persuasion burden. The former is a function of the latter; in other words, a party with the
burden of proof must produce enough evidence to meet the persuasion burden. John T.
McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of the Burden of Persuasion, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1383-85 (1955).
69. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-63 (1970).
70. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
71. The “clear and convincing evidence” standard is an intermediate standard between
“beyond a reasonable doubt” and “a preponderance of the evidence,” and is applicable in some
civil cases and with regard to some affirmative defenses in criminal cases. See Clark v.
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).

1818

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1793

Juries exercise their group agency based on judgments by individual
jury members and the aggregation rules that combine the individual
judgments into the jury’s judgment for each element. The jury’s
collective conclusions on the elements become the basis for verdicts,
the focus of epistemic evaluation by courts (for evidential sufficiency), and the foundation for legal judgments.72
The aggregation functions that fix jury conclusions are set by
procedural and constitutional rules that specify jury size and the
required number of juror votes. These requirements vary among
jurisdictions and types of cases, and are subject to some constitutional limits. In federal criminal cases, juries typically have twelve
members,73 and the verdict must be unanimous.74 However, subject
to judicial discretion, the parties may stipulate to smaller juries,
and the court may allow a jury of eleven to return a verdict when
a juror is dismissed for cause.75 States typically require between
six to twelve jurors for felony criminal cases and most require
unanimous verdicts.76 Louisiana and Oregon, however, allow for
nonunanimous verdicts in some felony criminal cases.77 The U.S. Supreme Court has provided a few constitutional guideposts on jury
size and voting rules in criminal cases. With regard to size, the
Court has held that six-member juries are constitutional,78 but that
five-member juries are not.79 With regard to voting rules, the Court
has held that twelve-member juries need not be unanimous,80 but
that six-member juries must be.81

72. A note on terminology is appropriate. The previous Parts followed the philosophical
literature in distinguishing epistemic “judgments” from mere “preferences.” Now that the discussion will focus in detail on juries, I will for the most part drop the use of “judgments” when
referring to the epistemic conclusions that jurors (and juries) draw from evidence so as not
to confuse them with legal judgments (which may or may not follow from a jury verdict). Rather, I will refer to juries’ epistemic judgments as verdicts, conclusions, inferences, or findings.
73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
74. Id. 31.
75. Id. 23(b)(2)-(3).
76. DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION, 2004, at 233 tbl. 42 (2006), available at http://perma.cc/L6JD-3CU2.
77. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2014).
78. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
79. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
80. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
81. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
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In civil cases, there is more variation. Federal civil juries typically
have six members.82 The verdict must be unanimous and returned
by at least six jurors, unless the parties stipulate otherwise.83 At the
state level, juries range from six to twelve, although in some states
parties may stipulate to fewer.84 Some states require unanimous
verdicts (sometimes parties may stipulate otherwise), some require
a supermajority (2/3, 3/4, 5/6), and others start with a unanimity
rule and reduce to a supermajority after a period of deliberation has
passed.85 The exact contours of the aggregation rules are less important for the purposes of this Article than the fact that there is such
a variety.86
The different aggregation functions among jurisdictions illustrate
the non-summative nature of jury conclusions. The exact same array
of individual juror conclusions may lead to different group conclusions (or lack thereof), depending on the jurisdiction’s aggregation
function. For example, suppose that among twelve jurors, ten
conclude that the prosecution has proven each element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, and two conclude that the prosecution
has failed to prove any of the elements. Given this collection of
individual conclusions, and assuming no jurors change their views,
the jury fails to reach a verdict in a jurisdiction requiring unanimity. The jury does, however, reach a verdict in a jurisdiction
82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 48.
83. Id.
84. See ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 76, at 233-37. In Nevada, for example, parties
in civil cases may stipulate to juries as few as four. NEV. SHORT TRIAL R. 22.
85. ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 76, at 233-37. For example, Nebraska has a 5/6
rule after six hours of deliberation. Id. Jurors are typically not told about the relaxed voting
requirement until the relevant time period has lapsed. In criticizing such rules, Jon Elster
writes: “The rationale for the ignorance is presumably that jurors will deliberate more seriously if they believe they all have to agree. Although this piece of judicial hypocrisy may seem
innocent, it may undermine the respect of the jurors for the court if they see through it.”
ELSTER, supra note 25, at 115.
86. This is not to deny the importance of the size and voting requirements for outcomes.
To the contrary, a rich social science literature illustrates the complex effects that these rules
have on issues such as deliberation, hung juries, and accuracy. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL.,
INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006); Daniel
Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgments, 121 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 149 (1997); Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Jury Size and the Hung-Jury Paradox,
42 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (2013). For an overview of the problematic relationship between the
Supreme Court’s case law on these rules and the relevant social science, see Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, Legal Reasoning and Scientific Reasoning, 63 ALA. L. REV. 895, 909-10 (2012).
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requiring a supermajority. The fact that the same set of individual
conclusions may result in differences at the group level means that
the group’s conclusion is more than the sum of the individual conclusions. The group’s conclusion supervenes87 on the individual
conclusions, but it depends on the aggregation function that fixes
the supervenience relation. The same collection of individual conclusions may result in contradictory group conclusions, or no group
conclusion—a fortiori, the group conclusion depends on more than
the individual conclusions.
The conclusions of juries and those of individual jury members
can come apart in a variety of different ways, with nonunanimous
and with unanimous aggregation functions. Consider the following
two examples. First, when a jurisdiction employs a nonunanimous
aggregation rule, juries may exhibit a form of the “discursive
dilemma”88 or “doctrinal paradox.”89 Suppose that a plaintiff ’s cause
of action contains four elements: A, B, C, and D. To win, the plaintiff
must establish each by a preponderance of the evidence. Suppose
the aggregation rule requires a vote of nine members out of a
twelve-member jury to establish whether each element is proven.90
We might get the following result: the plaintiff wins—according to
the jury—even though every single member believes the plaintiff has
failed to establish the claim. This could arise when the jurors
disagree on which element the plaintiff failed to establish. For
example, the voting might look like this:
Is element A proven? Nine “yes” votes (jurors 1-3 vote “no”);
Is element B proven? Nine “yes” votes (jurors 4-6 vote “no”);
Is element C proven? Nine “yes” votes (jurors 7-9 vote “no”);
Is element D proven? Nine “yes” votes (jurors 10-12 vote “no”).

In this case, the group’s collective conclusion is not summative of
the individuals in the group because the group concludes the plaintiff has proven the claim and yet every juror concludes that the
plaintiff has not.
87. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
88. See List & Pettit, supra note 28, 380-81.
89. See generally Kornhauser & Sager, The One and the Many, supra note 7.
90. This is the voting rule in at least ten states. See ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra
note 76.
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Second, group-individual judgments may also come apart under
a unanimity rule. Suppose that a statute criminalizes a pattern of
illegal conduct. Under the statute, to find the defendant guilty the
jury must find three underlying illegal acts by the defendant.91 The
court instructs the jury that they must unanimously agree on three
specific acts committed by the defendant to find him guilty. The
prosecution presents evidence of six underlying acts by the defendant: A, B, C, D, E, and F. The twelve jurors all conclude that the
defendant violated the statute, but six jurors believe the defendant
committed A, B, and C (but not D, E, and F), and six jurors believe
the defendant committed D, E, and F (but not A, B, and C ). Given
these votes and the applicable aggregation rules, the jury has failed
to conclude the defendant is guilty of violating the statute, even
though every single juror believes the defendant is guilty.
B. Collective Epistemology and Jury Agency
The epistemic judgments of juries are non-summative in nature.
This conclusion gives only one piece of the collective epistemology of
the jury. This Section discusses the other epistemic components of
juries’ epistemic judgments: justification, truth, and the connection
between the two.
As with individual conclusions or beliefs, we can inquire into
whether a jury’s conclusion is epistemically justified. Justification
in the jury context depends on the sufficiency of the evidence
presented to the jury on that issue in light of the applicable
standard of proof. In both the criminal and civil contexts, the U.S.
Supreme Court has expressed the applicable rule in non-summative
terms. In other words, it is the jury’s (and not individual members’)
judgments that are evaluated for evidential sufficiency.92 Courts
91. Such a requirement may be the case, for example, under a “continuing criminal
enterprise” statute. See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 815 (1999).
92. See supra note 67. The law adopts a rule-based approach in ascribing epistemic
justification to verdicts. See generally Frederick Schauer, In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence
Law—and Epistemology Too, 5 EPISTEME 295 (2008) (arguing that rule-based evidentiary
exclusions are consistent with the general exclusory nature of legal rules). In evaluating
evidential sufficiency in both criminal and civil cases, courts inquire into whether the jury as
a whole could reasonably reach a particular conclusion in light of the evidence and the burden
of proof, not what any individual juror thinks. See FED. R. EVID. 606. In ascribing epistemic
justification based on the burden-of-proof rules, it is possible that the law may ascribe
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examine whether a “reasonable” or “rational” jury could reach a
particular conclusion.93 Similarly, when civil juries provide either
special verdicts or general verdicts with answers to interrogatories,
courts attempt to render the jury’s conclusions consistent as a whole
(that is, as a unified decision-making body).94
In addition to these justificatory requirements, both individual
members and the collective jury have a number of duties and obligations in performing their epistemic tasks. For example, jurors are
instructed to deliberate with fellow jurors, and to do so by offering
reasons, keeping an open mind, and listening to the views and
reasons of jurors holding contrary views.95 Likewise, jurors are
instructed to base their decisions on reasoning from the evidence
rather than on other factors such as sympathy for, or antipathy or
bias toward, one of the parties.96 Moreover, epistemic responsibility
is an important aspect of justification, and a number of instructions
focus on epistemic virtues (for example, considering alternative
explanations for evidence) and vices (such as flipping a coin) that
apply to jury decision making.97 When faced with these epistemic
duties and obligations, the jury acts as a fiduciary, with characteristics similar to other fiduciary relationships—namely, those of trust,
discretion, and vulnerability.98
The justification of the jury’s conclusion and the justification of
the conclusions of individual jurors may diverge. It could turn out
that a jury’s conclusion is supported by the evidence and thus
justified, according to the applicable proof rules, but that every
individual on the jury is not epistemically justified in reaching that
conclusion (for example, the jurors did not understand the evidence
justification to a verdict in a particular case even when the jury’s verdict is not, in fact,
epistemically justified.
93. See supra note 67.
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 49. Inconsistent criminal verdicts are discussed in Part VI.
95. See, e.g., COMM. ON FED. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,
PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT (2012), available at http://
perma.cc/W7U2-NBKH.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. In an illuminating article, Ethan Leib, Michael Serota, and David Ponet argue that
fiduciary obligations apply to both the jury qua group and to individuals, acting as fiduciaries
for “the people” generally. Ethan J. Leib et al., Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2014) (“[B]oth the individual juror and the petit jury as a whole are
fiduciaries for ‘the people.’”).
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and voted for reasons wholly unrelated to the quality of the
evidence). Likewise, a jury’s conclusion may be based on insufficient
evidence—and thus rejected by a reviewing court—but individual
jurors may be epistemically justified in forming an individual
conclusion to the same effect (for example, these jurors have
additional information that was not presented at the trial).99
The next major epistemic component is truth. Both individual and
group conclusions aim at truth as a fundamental goal. Both individual and group knowledge imply truth, that what is known is so.100
If something is not true, then an individual or a group cannot know
it. In the legal realm, of course, there is often no independent means
for verifying truth,101 but we can and do nevertheless still recognize
this as the aim of trials.102 Even epistemically justified judgments
may be false. And there is an important sense in which an epistemically justified verdict that turns out to be false has failed.103 As in
the individual case, truth provides the target at which jury conclusions aim. Even when the participants do everything right on their
part, sometimes the jury misses the target.
From an epistemic standpoint, the group conclusions of juries
parallel the justified-true-belief framework for individual epistemic agents. The parallels run deeper still. As with the conclusions
of individual agents, jury conclusions may be subject to Gettier
conditions,104 and verdicts may be assessed based on their epistemic safety and sensitivity.105 Knowledge requires an appropriate
99. For example, a juror may come to learn about illegally obtained evidence that was
excluded but which nevertheless makes the juror’s true belief in the defendant’s guilt epistemically justified. This may be the case even though the jury’s verdict finding the defendant
guilty is unjustified, according to the law, because it is not supported by sufficient admissible
evidence.
100. See supra note 47.
101. DNA exonerations or subsequent confessions after the fact are exceptions that prove
the rule.
102. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
103. See ANTONY DUFF ET AL., 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF
THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 87-91 (2007).
104. See Michael S. Pardo, The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof, 16 LEGAL THEORY 37
(2010).
105. See David Enoch et al., Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of
Knowledge, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 197, 205, 215-16 (2012); Mark McBride, Reply to Pardo:
Unsafe Legal Knowledge?, 17 LEGAL THEORY 67 (2011); Michael S. Pardo, More on the Gettier
Problem and Legal Proof: Unsafe Nonknowledge Does Not Mean that Knowledge Must Be Safe,
17 LEGAL THEORY 75 (2011).
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connection between truth and justification conditions—a purely
accidental connection between the two (in other words, a true belief
that is true for reasons unrelated to those that justify the belief)
undermines a claim to knowledge. The same Gettier conditions that
undermine knowledge also make legal verdicts problematic.106 A
true verdict based solely on falsified evidence is illegitimate and
should not be allowed to stand when the false nature of the evidence
is revealed. Similarly, verdicts are more warranted to the extent
they are safer and more sensitive. Recall, safety concerns whether
a jury’s true judgment could have turned out to be false, and sensitivity concerns whether the jury would have reached the same true
judgment had it been false.107 Safe and sensitive verdicts are epistemically superior to unsafe and insensitive ones.108
To sum up briefly: the previous Part discussed groups as collective epistemic agents by comparing them with individuals. This Part
then applied the general account to the specific context of juries,
noting how the various epistemic components arise in the institutional context of legal fact-finding. This Article now turns to the
theoretical and practical implications of the analysis of juries as
group epistemic agents.
IV. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: EVIDENCE THEORY AND
PARADOXES OF PROOF
Juries, as group epistemic agents, reach factual conclusions about
whether certain propositions have been proven. Little has been said
thus far about the details of the epistemic conclusions reached by
jurors. In turning to this question, this Part argues that the conception of juries as group agents contains important lessons for understanding legal evidence and proof. Moreover, for reasons explored
below and in Part V, the significance is not only of theoretical
import—a number of practical insights follow.
Some basics of the proof process are uncontroversial. Juries
provide factual conclusions on each of the elements of a crime, civil
claim, or affirmative defense.109 These conclusions are whether the
106.
107.
108.
109.

See generally Pardo, supra note 104.
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
See generally Enoch et al., supra note 105; Pardo, supra note 105.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens
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party with the burden of proof on an element has proven it to the
applicable standard of proof. The three common standards of proof
are: “a preponderance of the evidence” (applicable in most civil cases
and for affirmative defenses in some criminal cases);110 “beyond a
reasonable doubt” (constitutionally required for the elements of
crimes and applicable for some affirmative defenses);111 and, to a
lesser extent, “clear and convincing evidence” (applicable on some
issues in civil and criminal cases).112 Jurors rely on the admissible
evidence to make these determinations, and trial and appellate
courts review the sufficiency of the evidence and the reasonableness
of jury conclusions in light of these standards.113
Theoretical accounts of legal proof take the foregoing as a starting
point. Two leading theoretical accounts, probabilistic and explanatory, conceptualize the nature of juror factual conclusions, and the
inferences leading to them, in light of the proof standards. The first
conceives of the standards as probabilistic thresholds and jury
conclusions as probabilistic judgments;114 the second conceives of
the standards as explanatory thresholds and jury conclusions as explanatory judgments.115 As explored in prior literature, the probabilistic conception faces a number of conceptual problems.116 The
most famous (or notorious) has come to be called the “conjunction
paradox,” or the “conjunction problem.”117 The explanatory conception, by contrast, avoids the conjunction paradox.118 The prior
debates within evidence law on these competing conceptions have
largely focused on, or assumed, decisions by a single or unified
decision maker, rather than examining the analytical issues that
may arise from the group aspects of proof.119
of Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893
(surveying jury instructions).
110. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
111. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
112. See supra note 71.
113. See supra note 67.
114. These two conceptions are explored in detail in my prior Article, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory. Pardo, supra note 11.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 14.
118. Allen & Jehl, supra note 109; Allen & Stein, supra note 14; Pardo & Allen, supra note 11.
119. One notable exception is Conjunction and Aggregation. Levmore, supra note 15
(discussing the original conjunction problem from the perspective of aggregated juror judg-
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This Part demonstrates that group aspects give rise to additional
conceptual problems for the probabilistic account and provide
further vindication for the explanatory account. Some of these
theoretical implications follow for reasons analogous to the original
conjunction paradox, and thus my analysis first draws some lessons
from that paradox before introducing three new conceptual problems that arise because of group aggregation. The discussion proceeds in three sections: Section A outlines the two conceptions of
proof; Section B discusses the original conjunction paradox; and
finally, Section C introduces three conceptual problems at the group
level.
Before turning to these issues, however, a brief word on the
practical implications may help to center the theoretical discussions
to follow. Whenever jurors or judges draw inferences from evidence
and conclude whether a fact has been proven, they are presupposing
some conception of what is required of applicable legal standards as
well as what does or does not follow from the evidence.120 The theoretical accounts attempt to “make[ ] explicit what is implicit in these
practices.”121 Moreover, the accounts also allow us to examine
whether and how the practices and rules fit with or deviate from
the goals of the proof process specifically, and civil and criminal
litigation more generally.122 Thus, the theoretical discussions are
practically important precisely because they purport to tell us something important about how the law is implemented in individual

ments). In contrast, this Article focuses on aggregation to introduce new conceptual problems
using the original conjunction problem as illustrative. Levmore relies on Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem—which posits that group judgments increase in reliability as the group number
increases, assuming certain conditions are satisfied (most importantly, the individual judgments are independent of one another, rely on independent evidence, and are each more likely
to be true than false)—to rationalize the law’s current treatment of the conjunction issue. Id.
For a critique of Levmore, see Allen & Jehl, supra note 109. For other discussions of
Condorcet’s theorem and its uneasy relationship with legal issues, see ELSTER, supra note 25;
LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2; ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009); and
Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2 (2012) (analyzing the
aggregation of legal claims).
120. Pardo, supra note 11, at 553-54.
121. Id. at 554.
122. See Pardo, supra note 11 (providing a more detailed discussion); see also Lisa Kern
Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281 (2013) (discussing the relationship
between conceptions of evidence and issues throughout the litigation process, including discovery and appellate review).
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cases.123 This is true not only with regard to trial outcomes. It also
applies to cases that never make it to trial or are reversed on
appeal,124 cases that settle or are never filed or charged,125 and “primary” (that is, non-litigation) behavior126—because each depends on
some assessment of whether potential evidence is sufficient to
warrant a legal resolution. The practical implications thus ramify
throughout the law.127
A. Two Conceptions of Proof
The probabilistic and explanatory conceptions of proof each
provide accounts of the nature of evidence, the standards of proof,
juror inferences, and what it means for the evidence to satisfy a
standard.128 In outlining the two accounts, the discussion will focus
on general aspects of each to the extent necessary to ground the
analytical discussions to follow below. It will, therefore, gloss over
some nuances in the accounts.129
The probabilistic conception relies on standard probability theory
and its axioms to conceptualize the proof process.130 Standards of
proof, under this account, express probabilistic thresholds, and
jurors determine whether the probability of each element, given the
evidence, surpasses the threshold.131 Conventionally, “preponderance of the evidence” is taken to mean “proof greater than 0.5,”
“clear and convincing evidence” to mean “greater than 0.75,” and
“beyond a reasonable doubt” to mean “greater than 0.9.”132 The
123. Pardo, supra note 11.
124. See supra note 67.
125. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
126. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on
Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518 (2010).
127. Part V will explore some specific practical implications regarding verdicts, but the
more general practical implications of the theoretical debate should also be kept in mind.
128. Pardo, supra note 11.
129. Some of these details will be explored in the notes.
130. For an overview, see Pardo, supra note 11, at 574-75.
131. Id. at 574.
132. Id. at 590. The idea that standards of proof express probabilistic thresholds is a
common assumption among courts and scholars. See, e.g., Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 34546 (7th Cir. 1988) (“All burdens of persuasion deal with probabilities. The preponderance
standard is a more-likely-than-not rule, under which the trier of fact rules for the plaintiff if
it thinks the chance greater than 0.5 that the plaintiff is in the right. The reasonable doubt
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thresholds are points on a scale between 0 and 1, in which 1 means
certain truth, 0 means certain falsity, and 0.5 means complete
uncertainty or indifference.133 Thus, in a civil case under the preponderance standard, when the plaintiff ’s claim is made of two
elements, A and B, the jury determines whether the probability of
A is greater than 0.5 and whether the probability of B is greater
than 0.5.134 If the jury concludes that each element is proven beyond
0.5, then the verdict will be for the plaintiff; if the jury concludes
that the probability of either element is 0.5 or below, then the
verdict will be for the defendant.
The explanatory conception relies on a theory of cognition based
on the idea of “inference to the best explanation” and variations
on it.135 Under this conception, the standards of proof express explanatory thresholds, and jurors evaluate the plausibility of alternative explanations of the evidence and disputed events.136 Under
standard is much higher, perhaps 0.9 or better. The clear-and-convincing standard is
somewhere in between.”); United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 3.3 (4th ed. 2009); Richard
S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Lawmaking for
Burdens of Proof, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 574 (1987); Cheng, supra note 11, at
1256 (“As every first-year law student knows, the civil preponderance-of-the-evidence standard requires that a plaintiff establish the probability of her claim to greater than 0.5.”); Louis
Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 779-80 (2012); Fredrick E. Vars, Toward a
General Theory of Standards of Proof, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2010) (“The assumption that
the preponderance standard equals 0.5 and the clear-and-convincing standard equals 0.75 has
both descriptive and normative components.”); Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss Aversion,
Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 168 (2012).
Recent attempts to reinterpret probabilistic standards in order to respond to conjunction
concerns include Cheng, supra note 11; and Kevin M. Clermont, Death of Paradox: The Killer
Logic Beneath the Standards of Proof, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061 (2013).
133. Pardo, supra note 11, at 575, 578 n.129.
134. See Clermont, supra note 132, at 1106-07. For example, if the claim depends on whether there was an offer (element 1) and acceptance (element 2), the jury determines whether the
probability of an offer exceeds 0.5 and whether the probability of an acceptance exceeds 0.5.
135. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 596 & n.211, 597-98; Pardo & Allen, supra note 11, at 225,
227-29. Explanatory inferences play important roles in both scientific and everyday reasoning.
See PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (2d ed. 2004); Gilbert H. Harman,
The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REV. 88, 89 (1965). For a discussion of why the
major objections to inference to the best explanation in the philosophy of science do not carry
over to law, see Pardo & Allen, supra note 11, at 242-45. For a discussion on the psychology
of explanatory reasoning, see Tania Lombrozo, Explanation and Abductive Inference, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison
eds., 2012).
136. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 11, at 234-35. As a general matter, the criteria that
make explanations better “include: consistency, coverage, completeness, simplicity, absence
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the preponderance standard, the process most closely resembles one
of inference to the best available explanation.137 Specifically, jurors
evaluate which of the competing explanations better explains the
evidence and events, and then determine whether that explanation
includes the elements of the claim.138 For example, in a civil case
under the preponderance standard, when a plaintiff ’s claim involves
two elements, A and B, jurors evaluate whether the better explanation includes A and B.139 As with the probabilistic conception, higher
proof standards require higher thresholds, but under this account
the standards require greater explanatory thresholds.140 Under the
“clear and convincing” standard, the plaintiff ’s explanation must be
clearly and convincingly better than the defendant’s explanation,
and include the elements.141 Under the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard, there must be a plausible explanation consistent with
guilt (in other words, that includes each of the elements of the
crime) and no plausible explanation consistent with innocence (that
is, the explanation does not include one or more of the elements).142
B. The Conjunction Paradox
The conjunction paradox arises because under the probabilistic
conception, the law appears to ignore an elementary aspect of probability theory.143 Namely, the probability of two independent propositions is the conjunction or multiplication of each proposition.144
of gaps, coherence, consilience, and fit with background knowledge.” Pardo, supra note 11, at
597.
137. Pardo, supra note 11, at 603.
138. See id. at 598, 603-04. The explanations are either the ones offered by the parties or
formulated by jurors themselves. Id. at 597.
139. For example, when a claim concerns whether there was an offer and acceptance, jurors
evaluate whether the better explanation includes an offer and acceptance. See supra note 134
and accompanying text.
140. Pardo, supra note 11, at 604.
141. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 11, at 239-40.
142. Id. at 238-39. Under this conception, there are thus two ways a jury might acquit a
defendant: when the prosecution’s explanation is not plausible or by finding a plausible
explanation consistent with innocence. Cf. O’Laughlin v. O’Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 288, 297, 303
(1st Cir. 2009) (holding the evidence insufficient to support conviction, given prosecution’s
theory); United States v. Beard, 354 F.3d 691, 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding the evidence
sufficient because no plausible explanation consistent with innocence).
143. See Allen & Stein, supra note 14, at 562-63.
144. This is the so-called product rule. See id. (providing an overview of the rule).
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Return to the example of a civil case with two elements, A and B.
When a jury finds each element proven to 0.6, the plaintiff wins.
This is a consequence of the fact that the standard of proof applies
to each individual element.145 The plaintiff wins even though—assuming independence among the elements—the likelihood of the
plaintiff ’s claim is, because of the product rule, only 0.36 (0.6 x 0.6).
Thus, plaintiffs win under this conception even when their claims
appear not to be more likely true.146 The problem is exacerbated by
the addition of elements.147
The conjunction issue generates additional perverse implications
for the probabilistic account. Here are five of the more prominent
problems. First, suppose a second plaintiff brings an identical claim
involving elements A and B. A jury finds A is proven to 0.9 and B is
proven to 0.5. Unlike the plaintiff in the first case, the plaintiff in
the second case loses even though this plaintiff ’s claim is more
likely to be true in light of the evidence (0.45 versus 0.36). Under
this conception, whether parties deserve to win no longer appears
to track the strength of their claims in light of the evidence—surely
a problematic consequence for a system interested in accurate
outcomes.
Second, applying the probabilistic threshold (for example, “beyond
0.5”) to the case as a whole also causes problems. First, it is inconsistent with the law, and thus fails as an explanatory account of the
proof process. Second, its normative implications, if followed, would
create other difficulties. For example, a party’s proof requirements
would depend on the number of formal elements.148 The proof for
each element would appear to exceed “beyond a reasonable doubt”
and quickly approach certainty with only a modest number of elements.
Third, the foregoing scenario has assumed independence among
the elements, but this often will not be the case. This creates additional difficulties for the probabilistic account, because to correctly
145. See Allen & Jehl, supra note 109, at 899.
146. This appears to be inconsistent with the stated goals of the preponderance standard,
which are to minimize errors and to treat the parties roughly equal with regard to the risk
of an erroneous judgment. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991). These goals may
be better realized by siding with whatever claims are more likely true.
147. See Allen & Jehl, supra note 109, at 918-19; Pardo & Allen, supra note 11, at 253-55.
148. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 594.
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assess the probability of a claim as a whole, the jurors would need
to know the various dependence relationships among the elements,
which will almost never be known.
Fourth, the probabilistic conception faces problems even on single
element disputes. For example, suppose a plaintiff proves the element to 0.4, and the jury concludes the defendant’s alternative account is 0.2 likely. The plaintiff will lose, even though the plaintiff’s
account is twice as likely to be true as the defendant’s. This is
inconsistent with minimizing errors or treating the parties roughly
equally with regard to the risk of error.149
Fifth, to truly prove an element beyond 0.5—rather than
comparing the probability of each party’s account—would require
the party with the burden to disprove all the unknown possibilities
inconsistent with that party’s claim. This would be impossible and
is inconsistent with equal treatment with regard to the risk of error.
The discussion has focused on the preponderance standard for
purposes of illustration. Similar problems arise, mutatis mutandis,
for the other proof standards.150
In contrast, the explanatory conception avoids these perverse
implications. By first selecting among competing explanations, and
then examining whether the selected explanations entail the elements, the implications do not arise.151 The decision-making process
under this conception operates first at the level of cases as a whole,
and it is at this level that the standards of proof perform their
functions regarding accuracy and allocating the risk of error.152 The
149. A comparative proof process better accords with these goals. See Allen & Jehl, supra
note 109, at 937-38; Cheng, supra note 11. This problem (#4) and the one that follows in the
text (#5) assume that the probabilities match some objective feature in the world. One might
try to avoid these problems by conceiving of the relevant comparison as between a subjective
probabilistic belief in the truth of the proposition expressed by the element and a subjective
probabilistic belief in the negation of that proposition, but subjective probabilistic beliefs do
not advance the goals of the evidentiary proof process and are inconsistent with the requirements of evidence doctrine. Clermont, supra note 132, at 1128-29; see Pardo, supra note 11.
150. The primary difference is that with higher standards, the purported goal is to shift the
risk of error away from parties without the burden of proof (typically defendants) because of
unequal error costs. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 561, 566-67. Nevertheless, the same
conceptual problems caused by the conjunction of elements frustrate this goal as well. For
example, on a multielement claim, the prosecution may win even though the combined
probability of the elements is considerably lower than 0.9.
151. See Pardo, supra note 11 at 608-09.
152. See id. at 565-67. For example, in a civil case under the preponderance standard, each
side shares an equal risk that the better explanation will favor the other side (with ties going
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perversities of the probabilistic conception are perverse precisely
because they interpret the standards of proof in ways that frustrate
rather than further these functions or goals. The purpose of this
Section has not been to solve or resolve the conjunction problem in
probabilistic terms.153 Rather, the primary lesson to be gleaned from
the conjunction paradox is that the problems are not, in fact,
inherent in the legal proof process. The problems are features of a
probabilistic conception of that process and are generated by adopting that conception. They do not arise when legal proof is properly
understood in explanatory terms. This lesson will help to resolve the
additional conceptual issues that arise when we move from the level
of individual decision makers to groups.
C. Groups and Conceptual Problems
Group aggregation of individual judgments produces additional
conceptual problems for the probabilistic conception. Three such
problems are presented below. The first applies the discursive
dilemma,154 doctrinal paradox,155 to juries. The second illustrates
how outcomes may deviate under the probabilistic conception from
the strength of parties’ cases. The third illustrates how juror disagreements may produce group verdicts that are illegitimate because they violate the underlying aggregation rules. As with the
original conjunction problem, each is generated by features of the
probabilistic conception and ameliorated by the explanatory conception.
1. Problem 1: The Discursive Dilemma and Jury Verdicts
The first conceptual problem that arises from group dynamics
involves the discursive dilemma.156 In jurisdictions with a nonunanito the party without the burden of proof). The risk of error is accordingly shifted as the proof
standards increase.
153. For examples along these lines, see Cheng, supra note 11; Clermont, supra note 132;
Levmore, supra note 15.
154. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Jason Iuliano, relying on a probabilistic
conception of proof, argues that the discursive dilemma poses a problem for special verdicts
but not for general verdicts. Jason Iuliano, Jury Voting Paradoxes, 113 MICH. L. REV. 405
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mous mous aggregation rule, the jury may end up endorsing a
general conclusion that every juror rejects. The probabilistic
conception, in which jurors render probabilistic judgments on an
element-by-element basis, exacerbates the conceptual problems
generated by the discursive dilemma. By contrast, the explanatory
conception suppresses these problems.
Consider the following example:157 a plaintiff ’s claim contains four
elements, A, B, C, and D, each of which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Suppose the jurisdiction’s voting rule
requires a vote of nine members out of a twelve-member jury on
each element. Suppose further the voting breaks down as follows:
Is element A proven? Nine “yes” votes (jurors 1-3 vote “no”);
Is element B proven? Nine “yes” votes (jurors 4-6 vote “no”);
Is element C proven? Nine “yes” votes (jurors 7-9 vote “no”);
Is element D proven? Nine “yes” votes (jurors 10-12 vote “no”).

Under this scheme, the plaintiff wins even though every member
of the jury believes the plaintiff should lose. Probabilistic judgments
by jurors do nothing to prevent this perverse result (For example,
suppose each “yes” vote in the above scenario is based on the
judgment that the issue is proven to 0.6, and each “no” vote is based
on a 0.4 assessment.). Under the explanatory conception, however,
jurors decide based on the relative plausibility of the competing
explanations, and then examine whether the chosen explanation
includes the elements.158 As with the original conjunction problem,
this process tames the perverse consequences that follow from the
discursive dilemma. In the example, the plaintiff will offer an
explanation that includes elements A, B, C, and D, and the defendant will offer an explanation that fails to include one or more
elements. When faced with this comparative assessment of the
(2014). Under a probabilistic conception, however, the discursive dilemma extends to general
verdicts as well as to special verdicts because jurors are instructed, even with general
verdicts, to apply the standards of proof to individual legal elements, not to cases as a whole.
See Allen & Jehl, supra note 109. As I explain below, the implications of the paradox follow
from the probabilistic conception of proof, and they are tamed by the explanatory conception
of proof. The implications are not avoided by relying on probabilistic general verdicts and
eliminating probabilistic special verdicts.
157. See supra Part III.A.
158. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 606, 608.
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competing, integrated explanations as a whole, jurors will either
find the plaintiff ’s explanation better or not. If they do, then this
explanation will include the elements, and the plaintiff will win. If
not, then the plaintiff will lose. In the voting scheme outlined above,
each juror may reject the plaintiff ’s explanation as a whole—but for
different reasons—and thus vote for the defendant. Or each juror
may find the plaintiff ’s explanation to be better and accordingly
vote for the plaintiff because the chosen explanation entails all the
elements. Either possibility would better reflect actual trial practices, and better accord with the normative justifications for the
preponderance standard (minimizing and equalizing the risk of
error),159 than element-by-element probabilistic conclusions.
2. Problem 2: Plaintiffs with Worse Cases Win
The second conceptual problem concerns the fact that because of
group dynamics, outcomes deviate from the strength of parties’
cases under the probabilistic conception. Suppose, for example, a
six-member jury deciding a civil case. The applicable voting rule
requires a unanimous verdict. Suppose further that there is only
one element at issue in the case, thus eliminating the original
conjunction problem. The jury is instructed that the plaintiff must
prove the element by a preponderance of the evidence. The probabilistic conception generates anomalous results based on group
dynamics akin to, and in addition to, those that arise with the
original conjunction problem. Compare two possible cases. In
Case 1, each of the six jurors concludes that the plaintiff has proven
the contested element to 0.6—thus resulting in a verdict for the
plaintiff. In Case 2, five jurors conclude that the plaintiff has proven
the contested element to 0.95, and one juror concludes that the
plaintiff has proven this element to 0.4. Under the applicable
aggregation rules, this would fail to produce a pro-plaintiff verdict.
It would do so even though the average of the jury’s judgments is
significantly higher in Case 2 than in Case 1 (0.858 versus 0.6).160
159. Under this conception, errors would be minimized to the extent that better
explanations are more likely to be true than worse ones, and the risk of error would be
roughly equal given that the better explanation may favor either side (with ties going to the
party without the burden of proof).
160. Averaging the jurors’ conclusions is only one possibility. Other aggregation rules (for
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Under the explanatory conception, these implications do not arise.
To obtain a pro-plaintiff verdict, the plaintiff must persuade each
juror that the plaintiff ’s explanation is better than the defendant’s.
As with the probabilistic conception, the jurors may fail to reach a
verdict because five conclude the plaintiff ’s burden has been met
and one juror concludes it has not been met. There is nothing
anomalous or problematic about this. It might even be the case that
five jurors are convinced that the plaintiff ’s explanation is significantly better than the defendant’s, and the one holdout juror is
mistaken. There is nothing anomalous or problematic about this
either. What does generate a conceptual problem, however, is the
combination of two assumptions: (1) that juror judgments express
cardinal probability judgments that can be averaged and (2) that
these judgments map onto the plaintiff ’s degree of proof. If these
two assumptions were true, then it would be perverse that the plaintiff wins in Case 1 and not in Case 2 because the plaintiff in Case 2
would have made a stronger showing that she was entitled to relief.
The fact that this is not so in reality provides further evidence that
there is something amiss with the probabilistic conception. The
explanatory conception, however, fits perfectly with this state of
affairs. Under the explanatory conception, jurors must reach
agreement on whether the plaintiff ’s explanation is better than the
defendant’s, not attempt to average their subjective mental states.
3. Problem 3: Juror Disagreements on the Details
In both criminal and civil cases, a source of considerable uncertainty surrounds issues regarding exactly what jurors must agree
upon to reach a verdict. These practical issues are explored in more
depth in the next Part. The general issue of juror disagreement,
however, also gives rise to a third conceptual problem for the probabilistic conception of proof.
Burdens and standards of proof apply to the formal elements of
a crime, civil cause of action, or affirmative defense. Thus, at a
minimum, jurors must agree on whether each element has been
proven to the applicable standard. This much is clear and uncontroversial. Confusion starts to arise, however, when we dig into exactly
example, looking for the median or mode) may produce similar distortions.
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what it means to agree on whether an element is proven. Do the
jurors agree the defendant committed burglary if six jurors believe
the defendant committed burglary in one apartment, and the other
six believe the defendant committed a different burglary in another
apartment across town (at the same time)? If presented with the
formal elements, and the question, “Has the prosecution proven burglary beyond a reasonable doubt?,” suppose the jurors all answer,
“yes.” Is this sufficient agreement to constitute a guilty verdict? The
answer appears to be no.161 Now consider a second case: suppose all
twelve jurors agree that the defendant committed the same burglary, but six jurors conclude that the defendant entered through an
unlocked window, and the other six jurors conclude that the defendant entered through an unlocked door. Is this sufficient agreement
to constitute a guilty verdict? The answer appears to be yes.162 The
practical issues generated by this problem fall in between these
relatively easy cases.163
As a theoretical matter, however, the probabilistic conception—in
which jurors reach probabilistic conclusions about each element—
does nothing to prevent problematic cases of disagreement. Jurors
may reach the exact same probabilistic conclusions on the formal
elements even when they disagree about which burglary the
defendant committed. Despite juror agreement on the probabilities,
juror disagreements may undermine verdicts. The probabilistic conception does not account for these failures of aggregation. Suppose,
for example, that a criminal statute requires a defendant to have
committed three prohibited acts during a specified period of time.164
Each juror concludes that it is 0.99 likely that the defendant
committed three such acts, but they do not agree on any three
specific acts. The probabilistic conception predicts that a valid guilty
verdict has been reached, but this does not necessarily follow.165
161. See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 816 (1999) (holding that “unanimity
in respect to each individual violation is necessary”).
162. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 627, 630-32 (1991) (holding that jurors do not need
to agree on the means of commission of a crime).
163. See infra Part V.
164. See Richardson, 526 U.S. at 816.
165. Id. at 824 (requiring jurors to agree on underlying acts, and not just on whether the
elements have been proven). This type of failure may also occur in a civil case when jurors
share a probabilistic conclusion but render inconsistent answers to interrogatories. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 49(b)(4).
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Sometimes disagreements of this sort will result in a failure to
establish a jury verdict.
Under the explanatory conception, these concerns are alleviated.
In focusing on competing explanations, the decision-making process
forces jurors to agree or disagree about contrasting versions of
reality.166 For any predicate act, the jurors should only convict when
they all agree that the prosecution’s explanation is plausible, and
there is no plausible defense explanation (consistent with innocence). As explored more fully in the next Part, the explanatory
account provides more clarity and guidance regarding exactly on
what jurors must agree. By contrast, the probabilistic account
implies consequences about collective jury judgments that are at
odds with both the reality of trials and the requirements of verdicts.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: JUROR AGREEMENT IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES
The explanatory account better explains the process of legal proof
than the probabilistic account. One reason for this, as Part IV argued, is that the explanatory account avoids the conceptual problems that beleaguer the probabilistic account on issues pertaining
to group agency. The theoretical analysis provides practical insight
on an issue that has generated considerable confusion at the doctrinal level: On what exactly must jurors agree to constitute a verdict?167
This issue relates to the third conceptual problem discussed in Part
IV. As that discussion illustrated, the probabilistic account predicts
that verdicts have been reached even when jurors disagree on
significant factual details; moreover, the account does not clarify
when such disagreements are benign and when they undermine
166. Consider, for example, the burglary hypotheticals discussed above. See supra notes
161-62 and accompanying text. To present a plausible explanation in the first hypothetical,
the prosecution would have to argue the defendant committed one or the other of the
burglaries. Absent extraordinary circumstances, an explanation that the defendant committed
two distinct burglaries at the same time in different locations is not plausible. But, in the
second hypothetical, jurors may all find the prosecution’s explanation to be plausible even
while disagreeing on whether the window or the door was the entry point.
167. A number of other scholars have contributed to clarifying these issues. See supra note
12. Their discussions, however, have largely taken the nature of juror conclusions and
inferences for granted (usually characterized simply as juror beliefs); this Article, by contrast,
is the first to tie the issue to the explanatory conception of the proof process. But see Larsen,
supra note 12 (discussing the story model and agreement in civil cases).
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verdicts. Rendering probabilistic judgments on the formal elements
may mask considerable disagreement among jurors about the
underlying facts they are being asked to find. For example, is the
burglary the defendant committed the one that occurred on the east
side of town in January or the one that occurred on the west side of
town in June? All factual disagreements are treated as irrelevant
under a probabilistic “formal elements” approach, as long as jurors
agree on the elements.
Under the explanatory account, jurors decide among competing
explanations, which describe different versions of reality. As a practical matter, this convergence on explanations eliminates some of
the underlying factual disagreements that may undermine verdicts.
In the typical case, jurors agree on an explanation, which may or
may not include the formal elements.168 When parties each present
a single competing explanation, the choice among contrasting explanations does not typically raise doctrinal issues about juror
agreement.
Rather, the doctrinal difficulties arise because parties sometimes
argue in the alternative. And jurors may disagree about different
aspects of these alternatives. When juries are presented with alternatives, the explanatory account provides doctrinal guidance; the
probabilistic account does not. When parties argue in the alternative, the proof process depends on the plausibility of their disjunctive explanations.169 The notion of a disjunctive explanation clarifies
the doctrine on juror agreement, and it provides practical insights
into both civil and criminal verdicts.
First, this Part explains the nature of disjunctive explanations;
second, it discusses how disjunctive explanations fit with civil verdicts; and finally, it discusses criminal verdicts and the Supreme
Court’s confusing case law on juror agreement.

168. This is why the explanatory account avoids the conceptual difficulty that arises for the
probabilistic account. For an example, see Problem 3 in Part IV.
169. For purposes of this Article, a “disjunction” is simply an explanation combining two
(or more) propositions with an “or.” Each proposition in the disjunction is a “disjunct.” By
contrast, two or more propositions combined with an “and” is a “conjunction,” composed of
“conjuncts.” “Disjunction” is a philosophical term of art in logic. See Ray Jennings & Andrew
Hartline, Disjunction, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 1, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/disjunction/ [http://perma.cc/TZH7-MYGR].
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A. Disjunctive Explanations
Under the explanatory conception, individual fact-finders decide
cases by selecting among competing explanations of the evidence
and underlying events. These explanations will contrast on one or
more key issues. The practical complexities arise because parties
may present and argue cases in the alternative,170 and consequently,
the explanations on which jurors make judgments may be disjunctive (for example, “X or Y ” explains the evidence and the events).171
Some examples will clarify the idea of a disjunctive explanation.
Suppose Jones has allergic reactions whenever he eats peanuts
and whenever he eats cashews, but no reactions when he eats
any other food. Now, suppose Jones has an allergic reaction after
eating Smith’s soup. Among the following two alternatives, which
one better explains Jones’s reaction?:

170. Although parties may argue in the alternative, it will often not be to a party’s
advantage to do so—single, detailed explanations will typically be more persuasive than
alternative, inconsistent ones. Sometimes, however, it will be to a party’s advantage to do so.
See, e.g., McCormick v. Kopmann, 161 N.E.2d 720, 726 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959) (allowing plaintiff
to argue inconsistent theories against two different defendants when the facts were uncertain
as to which defendant was liable). In addition to disjunctive explanations, depending on the
substantive law, parties may also offer general explanations (for example, in a res ipsa
loquitur case). General explanations may incorporate disjunctive explanations implicitly;
however, neither the party proffering such an explanation nor the jurors need identify any
particular disjunct. See, e.g., Erckman v. N. Ill. Gas Co., 210 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
171. The plausibility of disjunctive explanations is one way in which the (conceptual)
explanatory account may differ from the (empirical) story model in particular cases. See
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 527-28 (1991) (positing that the persuasiveness of a story
depends on its internal consistency, coherence, and completeness). These criteria also affect
the plausibility of explanations, but explanations may nevertheless be plausible even when
they do not track a specific story. See supra note 136. Another significant difference is that
under the explanatory account, fact-finders employ standards of proof (for example, “beyond
a reasonable doubt”) in evaluating whether to accept competing explanations. By contrast,
under the story model, as articulated by Pennington and Hastie, fact-finders first construct
a particular story or narrative and then apply the standard of proof in evaluating (1) whether
the accepted story fits the verdict categories and (2) their subjective confidence in the accepted
story. See Pennington & Hastie, supra, at 530-31 (“The third processing stage in our
hypothesis regarding the juror’s decision making involves matching the accepted story with
each of the verdict definitions. In cognitive processing terms, this is a classification process
.... The story classification stage also involves the application of the judge’s procedural
instructions on the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof.” (emphasis added)).
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Explanation A: the soup contained shellfish; or
Explanation B: the soup contained peanuts or cashews.

Based on the available information, Explanation B is better than
Explanation A, even though we may not be able to determine which
of the disjuncts (peanuts or cashews) is true.172
How does this play out in the trial context? Consider the next
example. Suppose the plaintiff is entitled to recover in a civil case
if the defendant drove through a red light, and the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover if the defendant drove through a green or yellow
light.173 The proper explanatory contrast174 for the jury in this case
is between:
Explanation A: the light was red; or
Explanation B: the light was green or yellow.

This contrast will be decided by each individual juror. Aggregation
problems arise when jurors disagree about the disjuncts in a
disjunctive explanation. This disagreement may result in a failure
to satisfy the requisite aggregation rules. Continuing with the
example, suppose the jury is twelve members, and the jurors must
reach a unanimous decision. If all twelve jurors conclude that the
explanation “green or yellow ” is better than the explanation “red,”
then the defendant ought to win. This is why a “single theory”
approach, in which jurors must agree on a specific factual scenario,
means, or theory, is defective.175 Likewise, if all twelve jurors conclude that green is better than red (but yellow is false), then the
defendant ought to win. The same is true if all twelve jurors
172. In accepting the disjunctive explanation, we can also say that if it turns out not to be
peanuts, then it must be cashews. And if it is not cashews, then it must be peanuts. Cf.
Westen & Ow, supra note 12, at 154 (proposing that this type of agreement about “alleged
means” is required in criminal cases). “[I]f the defendant did not commit the alleged offense
by one of the alleged means, he must have committed it by another of the alleged means.” Id.
173. See Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87
VA. L. REV. 1551, 1578 (2001) (presenting this example and suggesting “third story” possibilities create challenges for evidence theory); Pardo & Allen, supra note 11, at 250-53
(explaining why the explanatory conception can accommodate this example and third stories
generally).
174. The contrast between the parties’ explanations will depend on the substantive law and
how the parties choose to present their cases. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 11, at 230-32.
175. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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conclude that yellow is better than red (but green is false). So far, so
good. But, what if six jurors conclude that green is a better explanation than red (but yellow is false), and six jurors conclude that
yellow is better than red (but green is false)? This is a problem
because this jury does not, in fact, agree on Explanation B.
This might seem strange at first because yellow logically entails
yellow or green.176 Therefore, however likely one thinks yellow is,
one will also think yellow or green is at least as likely (plus the
likelihood of green).177 This is why, under the probabilistic account,
disagreements on yellow versus green do not matter, and the
probability conclusions on each may be aggregated. The point about
entailment is true, of course, but believing one side of a disjunction
does not in fact mean that one is committed to the disjunction as a
whole.178 Disagreements of this sort mean that two individuals may
not be in agreement about an explanation. Suppose a tornado rips
through our town. I may think that climate change (resulting from
human activities) caused the tornado, and you may think it was the
result of God’s wrath. We do not agree that climate change or God’s
wrath explains why the tornado occurred. Why not? If I were to
discover evidence demonstrating that climate change could not have
caused the tornado, I would not then believe that it must be God’s
wrath.179 Likewise, if I convince you that God’s wrath did not cause
the tornado, you would not necessarily then believe that climate
change was responsible. But, if we were each committed to the truth
of the disjunction, then as a formal matter, we should believe the
other disjunct when our initial preferred disjunct was proven false.
In short, sticking an “or” in between our contradictory beliefs does
not necessarily commit each of us to the disjunction, even when we
176. The disjunction is true if either disjunct is true. Therefore, if yellow is true, then
yellow or green is necessarily true.
177. If yellow is 0.4 likely, then yellow or green is greater than or equal to 0.4.
178. Sachs usefully employs the distinction between “dependent” and “independent”
evidence for a disjunction to emphasize whether one’s evidence supports a particular disjunct
(dependent) or the disjunction as a whole (independent). Sachs, supra note 12, at 48. Sachs
relies on a similar distinction employed by Brian Skyrms in discussing the Gettier problem.
See Brian Skyrms, The Explication of “X Knows That p,” 64 J. PHIL. 373, 379-80 (1967)
(distinguishing derivative versus nonderivative epistemic support for a disjunction).
179. This sort of disconnect between disjuncts is part of the reason that proofs based on
“the principle of explosion” (or “everything follows from a contradiction”) lead to absurd
conclusions. See Graham Priest et al., Paraconsistent Logic, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr.
5, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/ [http://perma.cc/R87K-XRSC].
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are otherwise committed to half of it. But we will be committed to
it when, as with yellow or green, we think that one or the other is
the likely explanation, even if we cannot specify which.180
For another example, consider again Jones’s allergic reaction.
Suppose we are now trying to decide what explains it, and we know
that Jones ate shellfish, peanuts, and rice. If faced with a contrast
between (1) shellfish, on one hand, and (2) peanuts or rice, on the
other, I might think that peanuts is a better explanation than shellfish, and that rice is false (and thus shellfish is a better explanation
than rice), and you might think that rice is a better explanation
than shellfish, and that peanuts is false (and thus shellfish is a
better explanation than peanuts). When we disagree like this, we do
not agree that peanuts or rice is a better explanation than shellfish.
Similar considerations apply to preferences—as opposed to epistemic judgments—in a way that further illustrates the nature of
disjunctions. Suppose we are sharing a pizza and deciding on
toppings. You prefer spinach to plain cheese, and I prefer pepperoni
to plain cheese. But you prefer plain cheese to pepperoni, and I
prefer plain cheese to spinach. We do not agree that spinach or
pepperoni is better than cheese as a pizza option. Compare this to a
situation in which we each prefer either spinach or pepperoni to
plain cheese. In that case, we would agree that spinach or pepperoni
is better than plain cheese. Similarly, jurors agree that the explanation green or yellow is better than red when they each think that (1)
the disjunction as a whole, (2) the same one of its disjuncts, or (3) a
combination of (1) and (2) is better than the alternative. They fail to
agree when at least one juror accepts only part of a disjunctive
explanation, and another juror accepts only a different part of the
disjunction. The possibility of such disagreements is why a “formal
elements” approach,181 in which jurors only vote on whether each
element of a crime, claim, or defense has been proven, is defective.
B. Civil Cases
How does the analysis regarding disjunctive explanations apply
to actual cases? To illustrate, consider the facts of Anderson v.
180. See supra note 172.
181. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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Griffin.182 Following a traffic accident, the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff ’s injury.183 The accident
occurred because a “driveline” on a semi-tractor truck broke,
thereby severing the truck’s brake pedal from the brake.184 The
defendant was the repair shop that performed maintenance on the
truck’s driveline weeks before the accident.185 The plaintiff argued
that the defendant was negligent in its repairs (Explanation A).186
The defendant offered two alternative explanations for the driveline
breaking: there was a hidden defect that could not be discovered at
the time of the repairs (Explanation B), and the driveline was not
defective and road debris was thrown against the yolk of the truck
with such force that it caused the driveline to break (Explanation
C ).187 If A is true, then the plaintiff deserves to win; if B or C is true,
then the defendant deserves to win. Thus, the appropriate explanatory contrast is between A, on one hand, and B or C, on the other.188
The six-member jury must reach a unanimous decision, and the
plaintiff must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. If
all six jurors conclude that the disjunctive explanation B or C is as
good as or better than A, then there should be a verdict for the
defendant. The same result occurs when:
1. Six jurors conclude that B is as good as or better than A (and
reject C as false); or
182. 397 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2005).
183. Id. at 517-18.
184. Id. at 517.
185. Id. at 517-18.
186. Id. at 518.
187. Id. at 518, 521-22.
188. For examples of courts incorrectly requiring too much specificity, and not recognizing
the appropriateness of disjunctive explanations, see Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 81
Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 265-66 (Ct. App. 1999) (requiring through special interrogatories that jurors all agree on one of five possible explanations for how defendant’s negligence caused
plaintiff’s injury); and Rhesa Shipping Co. v. Edmunds, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 948 (H.L) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (requiring plaintiff to identify a particular cause of ship’s sinking that would
entitle them to recover on an insurance policy, rather than alternative “peril of the sea”
theories). A number of cases have recognized the acceptability of disjunctive explanations, but
these disjunctions raise the possibility of juror disagreements that may undermine verdicts.
See Zuchowitz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1998); Stoner v. Williams, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 252 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that jurors need only agree on whether elements are proven, not underlying theory); Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 140 (N.Y.
1919).
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2. Six jurors conclude that C is as good as or better than A, (and
reject B as false); or
3. Some jurors conclude the disjunctive explanation, B or C, is as
good as or better than A, and the remaining jurors all conclude
that one of the disjuncts (but not the other) is as good as or
better than A—so long as it is the same disjunct.

The problem, from an aggregation standpoint, occurs when at least
one of the six jurors accepts B ( but rejects C ), and at least one of the
six jurors accepts C ( but rejects B ). In this instance, the group has
failed to arrive at a collective finding about the competing explanations that would support a verdict for the defendant.189
The practical difficulties posed by this type of disagreement run
deep. So deep, in fact, that even special verdicts and interrogatories
may fail to expose it. For example, in a negligence case, suppose the
plaintiff offers a disjunctive explanation for why the defendant
should be held liable: faulty repairs on a truck (explanation X ) or
inadequate inspection (explanation Y ). Six jurors vote for a general
verdict for plaintiff. They are also asked to answer the following
interrogatories:190
(1) Do you find unanimously that the plaintiff has proven X by
a preponderance of the evidence?
(2) Do you find unanimously that the plaintiff has proven Y by
a preponderance of the evidence?

If the jury answers “no” to both questions, the court may enter a
judgment for the defendant, just as the court may do had there been
a special verdict posing these two questions.191 However, this may
be an error. It might have been the case that three jurors concluded
that the disjunctive explanation (X or Y ) was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and three concluded that X was proven (but
rejected Y ). In such a case, a judgment for the plaintiff is warranted
(assuming the evidence is sufficient). If, however, three conclude
that X is proven (and reject Y ), and three conclude that Y is proven
189. The probabilistic account, however, would erroneously predict that a valid verdict has
been reached. See supra Part IV.C.3. The problem identified in the text may also arise with
a plaintiff’s disjunctive explanations.
190. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(1).
191. Id. 49(a).
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(and reject X ), then despite the general verdict voted on by the
jurors, they have failed to arrive at a unanimous verdict for the
plaintiff. But they have not necessarily arrived at a verdict for the
defense, either—more deliberation is necessary. The upshot is that
even detailed special verdicts and interrogatories may mask the
underlying problem (which may operate to either the plaintiff ’s or
the defendant’s disadvantage, depending on the details).192
C. Criminal Cases
The issue of juror agreement has received more attention in the
context of criminal cases, from both courts and academic commentators, than in civil cases.193 Nevertheless, considerable confusion
remains. The starting point for the issue of juror agreement in

192. When parties offer alternative explanations, more detailed (and carefully crafted) jury
instructions may alert jurors themselves to the issue. Recent empirical evidence on actual jury
deliberations suggests that jurors take detailed instructions on the law seriously and that
their discussions of the law are generally accurate, but the same evidence also suggests that
“the more challenging obstacles to optimal jury performance in dealing with the law arise ...
from deep structural issues and failures to confront inconsistencies and ambiguities in the
law.” Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1552, 1606 (2012) (reviewing 13,519
juror comments about the law from jury deliberations in fifty cases). The failure to instruct
jurors on how to resolve disagreements about alternative explanations poses just such a
challenge. In the above example in the text (drawn from Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515
(7th Cir. 2005)), an instruction like the following may suffice to inform jurors on the issue:
You must find whether the defendant was negligent. The plaintiff has proposed two different
ways in which the defendant was negligent: (1) in making faulty repairs to a truck and (2) by
failing to properly inspect the truck. You should find for the plaintiff if you conclude the
plaintiff has proven the defendant was negligent in (1) repairing the truck, (2) inspecting the
truck, or (3) in either repairing or inspecting the truck. This last possibility means that you
think the defendant was negligent in either repairing or inspecting the truck, even though you
cannot determine which of the two actions he was negligent in performing.
In addition to your individual votes, you must reach unanimous agreement on whether the
defendant was negligent. You have reached agreement if you all conclude that the defendant
was negligent (1) in repairing the truck, (2) in failing to inspect the truck, or (3) either in
repairing or inspecting the truck (in the way I just explained to you). You are not in agreement
if at least one of you thinks that the defendant was negligent in repairing the truck but not in
inspecting it, and one of you thinks that the defendant was negligent in inspecting the truck but
not in repairing it. If you find this situation should arise, then you must continue to deliberate
until you reach unanimous agreement.
193. See supra note 12.
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criminal cases is a pair of United States Supreme Court opinions:
Schad v. Arizona194 and Richardson v. United States.195
In Schad, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder.196
The victim was found strangled on the side of the highway in
Arizona.197 His car and wallet were stolen.198 The defendant was
arrested three weeks later in New York driving the victim’s car and
using the victim’s wallet.199 The jury was instructed that they could
convict the defendant of first-degree murder if they found that
either the defendant (1) killed the victim intentionally, or (2) killed
him unintentionally while committing a robbery (felony murder).200
The defendant claimed the evidence proved “at most that he was a
thief, not a murderer.”201
On appeal, the defendant argued that it was an error for the trial
court not to instruct the jury that they had to agree on a theory
(intentional killing or felony murder) in order to convict.202 A divided
Court sided 5-4 in favor of the State and rejected the defendant’s
claim.203 Justice Souter’s plurality opinion, joined by three others,
focused on the constitutionality of the State’s statutory scheme of
treating premeditated killing and felony murder equivalently—as
two “means” of committing the same crime.204 Their opinion also
focused on both historical practices and the “moral equivalence” of
the two alternatives, concluding that the scheme did not run afoul
of the Constitution.205 Justice Scalia concurred on historical grounds,
but rejected the plurality’s “moral equivalence” test.206 Justice
194. 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
195. 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
196. Schad, 501 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor and Kennedy,
JJ.).
197. Id. at 627.
198. Id. at 628.
199. Id.
200. The jury was instructed: “First degree murder is murder which is the result of premeditation.... Murder which is committed in the attempt to commit robbery is also first degree
murder.” Id. at 629 (alteration in original).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 630.
203. Id. at 646-48 (plurality opinion).
204. Id. at 631-33 (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ.).
205. Id. at 641-45.
206. Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he petitioner
here does not complain about lack of moral equivalence: He complains that, as far as we know,
only six jurors believed he was participating in a robbery, and only six believed he intended
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White, joined by three Justices, dissented. According to the dissent,
“While a State is free to construct a statute in this way, it violates
due process for a State to invoke more than one statutory alternative, each with different specified elements, without requiring that
the jury indicate on which of the alternatives it has based the
defendant’s guilt.”207 Because Arizona defined first-degree in two
alternative ways, the dissent argued that the jury must unanimously agree on one of the alternatives.208 By not requiring such
agreement, the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict.209
The explanatory conception of proof sheds light on the Schad
outcome, and also why the Court’s opinions fail to zero in on the
aggregation issue. The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is satisfied under the explanatory account when there is a plausible
explanation consistent with guilt and no plausible explanation consistent with innocence.210 Either component of the standard may be
disjunctive. In Schad, therefore, every juror could have concluded
the disjunctive explanation (intentional or felony murder) was plausible—in other words, that the disjunctive explanation successfully
explained the evidence and events, even if jurors could not say
which of the two disjuncts was more likely to be true—and that the
defendant’s explanation was not plausible. In this scenario, a
unanimous verdict would have been reached. In failing to recognize
the possibility of disjunctive explanations, the dissent’s analysis is
therefore unsatisfactory.

to kill. Perhaps moral equivalence is a necessary condition for allowing such a verdict to stand,
but surely the plurality does not pretend that it is sufficient. (We would not permit, for
example, an indictment charging that the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on
Wednesday, despite the ‘moral equivalence’ of those two acts.)”).
207. Id. at 656 (White, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 655 (“[I]t is entirely possible that half of the jury believed the defendant was
guilty of premeditated murder and not guilty of felony murder/robbery, while half believed
exactly the reverse. To put the matter another way, the plurality affirms this conviction
without knowing that even a single element of either of the ways for proving first-degree
murder, except the fact of a killing, has been found by a majority of the jury, let alone found
unanimously by the jury as required by Arizona law. A defendant charged with first-degree
murder is at least entitled to a verdict—something petitioner did not get in this case as long
as the possibility exists that no more than six jurors voted for any one element of first-degree
murder, except the fact of a killing.”).
209. Id. at 659.
210. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 11, at 241.
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A successful verdict could have arisen in other ways as well. For
example, if half the jury concluded that the disjunctive explanation
was plausible and the other half concluded felony murder (but not
intentional murder) was plausible, then the jurors agree on firstdegree murder. But the dissent was certainly correct that this
particular jury may have failed to agree. This would have been the
case if some jurors thought the intentional-murder explanation was
plausible (and the felony-murder explanation was not), and some
thought the felony-murder explanation was plausible (and the
intentional-murder explanation was not). The evidence appears
sufficient to support the disjunctive explanation of guilt, but we simply do not know whether the jurors agreed.
The dissent’s analysis, although unsatisfactory, came closer than
others to the relevant aggregation issue: Do the jurors agree on a
disjunctive explanation, or one or another of its disjuncts? Although
historical practices in defining crimes and moral equivalence may
be relevant to due process analysis, neither criterion touches the key
issue of juror agreement in Schad.211 The key issue was whether the
jury concluded that a disjunctive explanation (or one of its disjuncts)
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.212 As with civil cases, better
instructions may alert jurors and judges to the aggregation failure
that may occur when some jurors accept only part of a disjunctive
explanation, and other jurors accept only a distinct part of that ex-

211. Cf. Westen & Ow, supra note 12, at 168-69, 185 (arguing that the key due process
issue in Schad is whether the conviction accords with the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
requirements of In re Winship).
212. See id. This Article extends the illuminating analysis of Westen and Ow in two
directions. First, Westen and Ow take the nature of juror conclusions for granted and focus
(following Schad and Richardson) simply on the “means” by which a defendant committed the
crime. Id. at 155-57; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (“A count may allege that the means by
which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it
by one or more specified means.”). This Article connects the disagreement issue to the inferential process of jury conclusions—in other words, explanatory inferences. Second, the
analysis of disjunctive explanations applies not just to criminal convictions but also to civil
cases and the explanations proffered by criminal defendants. The issue of jury nullification
complicates the analysis with regard to criminal defendants. The explanatory conception
provides an account of what is required under the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, not
what jurors should do in individual cases once they conclude that the standard has been
satisfied. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 3 (1986) (distinguishing a determination of the
law on a legal question—that is, whether a proposition of law is true—from the determination
of how to decide a particular case).
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planation.213 This is a problem not because of statutory definitions;
it is a problem because the jury has not yet arrived at a verdict.
By focusing on statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court’s
other foray into the issue, Richardson v. United States, again
created uncertainty and failed to provide guidance on jury agreement.214 The defendant was convicted at trial under a federal
“continuing criminal enterprise” statute.215 The statute required the
prosecution to prove, among other elements, that the defendant
received “substantial income” from a “continuing series of violations” of federal drug laws, in concert with five or more persons
managed or organized by the defendant.216 The key issue in
Richardson was the proof requirements for the “continuing series of
violations” language in the statute.217 The district court instructed
the jury that they “ ‘must unanimously agree that the defendant
committed at least three federal narcotics offenses,’ while adding,
‘[y]ou do not ... have to agree as to the particular three or more
federal narcotics offenses committed by the defendant,’ ” rejecting
the defendant’s proposal that they must agree on three specific
acts.218 This difference mattered in the case because the prosecution
proffered evidence of more than three acts.219 Assuming the proper
number of acts was three,220 the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the jury had to agree on three specific acts:
We must decide whether a jury has to agree unanimously about
which specific violations make up the “continuing series of
violations.” We hold that the jury must do so. That is to say, a
jury in a federal criminal case brought under § 848 must
unanimously agree not only that the defendant committed some
“continuing series of violations” but also that the defendant

213. See supra note 192. As with the other examples explored in this Part, the probabilistic
conception again mistakenly predicts that a valid verdict has been reached even when this
type of aggregation failure has occurred.
214. 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
215. Id. at 815-16.
216. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A)-(B) (2012); see also Richardson, 526 U.S. at 815.
217. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 815.
218. Id. at 816 (alterations in original).
219. Id. at 818.
220. Id. (“We assume, but do not decide, that the necessary number is three, the number
used in this case.”).
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committed each of the individual “violations” necessary to make
up that “continuing series.”221

Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, joined by five others, relied primarily on considerations of statutory interpretation.222 Noting that
not requiring agreement on the underlying acts may mask significant juror disagreement—and perhaps also raise constitutional
issues because of unfairness and deviation from historical
practices—the Court concluded, “We have no reason to believe that
Congress intended to come close to, or to test, those constitutional
limits when it wrote this statute.”223 Thus the Court avoided an
interpretation that would raise constitutional issues, and opted for
a safer alternative (that is, requiring agreement).224
Justice Kennedy, joined by two others, dissented.225 He challenged
the majority’s argument about intent, and he argued that Congress
was concerned with a particular type of criminal—“the drug kingpin”—and was not concerned with specific underlying acts as
opposed to the ongoing series of them in the aggregate.226 The
prosecution’s evidence suggested the defendant had engaged in
thousands of underlying transactions and was thus the type of
criminal for whom the statute was designed.227 Having concluded
that Congress did not intend for jurors to agree on underlying acts,
the dissent argued that such an interpretation was constitutional.228
Relying on Schad, the dissent concluded that the underlying acts
were permissible “alternative means” (such as the premeditation or
felony murder in Schad) of violating the statute.229 Moreover, the
statute, understood in this way, was neither unreasonable nor
fundamentally unfair.230

221. Id. at 815.
222. Id. at 818-20.
223. Id. at 820.
224. Id. As discussed in Part IV, disagreements in cases like Richardson pose a conceptual
problem for the probabilistic account because the probabilistic account says (mistakenly) that
a valid verdict has been reached.
225. Id. at 825 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 828-29.
227. Id. at 828, 832.
228. Id. at 835-37.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 836.
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The explanatory framework clarifies Richardson, and as with
Schad, illustrates why the Court failed to resolve the aggregation
issue.231 Assuming sufficient evidence to support each of the acts
alleged by the prosecution,232 a valid verdict would be reached if
each juror accepted a disjunctive explanation that referred to more
than three acts. Likewise, a valid verdict would be reached if half
the jury accepted the disjunctive explanation, and the other half
accepted three specific acts as proven (and rejected the rest), so long
as they were the same three acts. But an aggregation failure would
occur when half the jury concluded that three specific acts were
proven (but not the remaining acts), and the other half concluded
that a different three acts had been proven (but not the remaining
acts). This possibility appears to have animated some of the Court’s
reasoning in Richardson,233 but as with Schad, we do not know what
the actual jury accepted and thus whether a legitimate group judgment was in fact formed. The explanatory framework clarifies the
underlying potential problem. Recognizing the issue, and providing
better instructions, may alert jurors and judges to the aggregation
failure that may occur when some jurors accept only part of a
disjunctive explanation, and other jurors accept only a distinct part
of that explanation.234

231. See Westen & Ow, supra note 12, at 179-80 (“Kennedy displays something that is true
of his brethren as well: he is struggling to find an answer that he knows full well he has not
yet grasped.”).
232. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 831-32.
233. See id. at 819 (majority opinion) (“The first of these considerations increases the
likelihood that treating violations simply as alternative means, by permitting a jury to avoid
discussion of the specific factual details of each violation, will cover up wide disagreement
among the jurors about just what the defendant did, or did not, do. The second consideration
significantly aggravates the risk (present at least to a small degree whenever multiple means
are at issue) that jurors, unless required to focus upon specific factual detail, will fail to do so,
simply concluding from testimony, say, of bad reputation, that where there is smoke there
must be fire.”).
234. See supra note 192. Not requiring agreement may be a problem because of aggregation
failures. See Roth, supra note 12, at 196-97 nn.94-98 (collecting cases and instructions not
requiring agreement on prosecution theory). But requiring agreement without recognizing
disjunctive explanations is also a problem. See id. at 211 (“Several of the courts of appeals still
include some version of a ‘unanimity of theory’ instruction in their model jury instructions.”).
As the analysis in this Article indicates, the proper aggregation requirement in criminal cases,
as with civil cases, is in between these extreme positions.
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VI. COUNTERARGUMENTS
This Part considers and responds to two potential counterarguments. The first—the probabilist’s rejoinder—challenges the
explanatory analysis by contending that aggregating individual
jurors’ probabilistic judgments on the formal elements (regardless
of whether they agree on any other factual details) would constitute
a normative improvement over outcomes under both current
practices and the explanatory account. The second—the doctrinal
acceptance of inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases—challenges the
non-summative account of juries on which the analysis relies.
A. The Probabilist’s Rejoinder
The probabilistic account of proof fails to explain key aspects of
current legal doctrine and practices, and, moreover, it faces a
number of conceptual problems.235 The probabilist might respond,
however, that despite these descriptive and explanatory defects, the
probabilistic account is normatively superior.236 According to this
argument, the conclusions under a probabilistic model are more
likely to be accurate in the long run, and so to the extent current
practices are inconsistent with this model, too bad for current practices.
To flesh out this counterargument, consider again the example of
whether the stoplight was red (plaintiff wins) or green or yellow
(defendant wins).237 If half the jurors think the defendant should
win because the probability is 0.6 that the light was green, and the
other half think the defendant should win because the probability
is 0.6 that the light was yellow, then the defendant should win because the jury thinks it is 0.6 likely that the defendant is not
liable.238 However likely a juror thinks the green possibility, she will
235. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 574-76; see also supra Part IV.
236. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 11, at 1032 (proposing “normative” probabilistic theory
of relevance).
237. See supra Part V.A.
238. Likewise, under this conception, if every juror thinks the likelihood that the defendant
committed burglary exceeds whatever probabilistic threshold is required by beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the defendant should be convicted—even if each juror thinks he
committed a different burglary and did not commit any of the others.
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think the green or yellow possibilities are at least that likely (plus
whatever residual likelihood she attaches to yellow), and vice versa
for any juror who thinks yellow is the most likely possibility.
Aggregating probabilities over the elements in this way, so the
argument goes, for each element and then for the conjunction of the
elements will impose liability on defendants only when it is more
likely than not that they are, in fact, liable. Outcomes will be as
accurate as possible, and errors will be minimized in the long run.
There is something intuitively plausible about this argument.
Moreover, it is entirely possible that asking jurors to render probabilistic judgments could improve accuracy.239 Determining how
changes in the process of legal proof will affect the accuracy of outcomes involves incredibly complex empirical questions.240 But the
probabilist’s claims are doubtful for a number of reasons. First, the
argument depends on the idea that the probability judgments will
have some basis in reality—that they will refer to some objective
feature in the world (for example, relative frequencies).241 For most
items of evidence and claims, however, the relevant probabilities
are simply not available.242 This means that the probabilistic judgments will instead depend on the subjective beliefs of jurors.243
And there is no reason to think the subjective beliefs of jurors are
likely to match objective probabilities in any kind of reliable
manner.244 Indeed, there could be any (or no) relationship at all
239. Cf. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 25, at 260-61 (noting that neither voting by
overall outcome or issue-by-issue is epistemically superior as an a priori or formal matter);
List & Pettit, supra note 28, at 386 (“If I and other members regard the group as a loose
collection of individuals who pool their judgments solely to maximize the probability of
determining the truth on some issue, then an inconsistency in the group’s majority judgments
creates no particular problem by itself.”).
240. These include not only questions about the reliability of evidence and the epistemic
performance of decision makers, but also how the changes will affect primary and litigation
behavior.
241. Probabilities may refer to logical relations, frequencies, propensities, or subjective
degrees of belief. See Alan Hajek, Interpretations of Probability, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Dec. 19, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/ [http://perma.cc/QU67ZHRY].
242. And even when data are available for some items of evidence, the probabilities must
somehow be combined with other evidence for which no data are available.
243. See Hajek, supra note 241.
244. There is a rich literature on subjective probability theory and the reliance on Bayes’
Theorem to maintain consistency in a set of subjective judgments. See LEONARD J. SAVAGE,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 43-45 (1954). Subjective probability judgments, even those
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between the two. Therefore, there is no reason to think that
requiring jurors to rely on these subjective beliefs will improve
accuracy.245
Moreover, aggregation imposes additional informational demands.
In order to aggregate the probabilities among jurors for the different
factual scenarios that may fall under a formal element—at least in
a way that is likely to improve accuracy—they will need to know all
the ways the world could have been that are consistent with
liability, all the ways that are inconsistent with liability, and know
the objective probabilities that attach to each of the scenarios.246 It
is a fantasy to think these informational demands could ever be
met. To truly prove a case by a preponderance of the evidence, a
plaintiff would have to show that the combined probability of all the
possible ways in which the defendant is liable exceeds the combined
probability of all the possible ways in which the defendant is not
liable.247 If taken seriously, this would mean that any party with a
burden of proof on any issue in civil or criminal cases should lose.
This is not a recipe for improving the law.
Although changes along the lines suggested by the probabilistic
conception could possibly improve the law, the burden of proof
remains on the probabilistic conception to provide reasons more

that conform to Bayes’ Theorem, however, are unlikely to improve accuracy at trial unless the
subjective judgments match objective probabilities. See Alvin I. Goldman, Quasi-Objective
Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 237, 240 (2002). And nothing in a
subjective conception of legal proof guarantees this, or even makes it likely. See Allen & Stein,
supra note 14, at 566 (noting that any interpretation of probability other than a frequentist
one “make[s] no sense at all in the juridical context”).
245. Moreover, a number of procedural devices—summary judgment, judgment as a matter
of law, and sufficiency of the evidence—presuppose that judges can separate reasonable from
unreasonable jury conclusions. See supra note 67. This separation is not possible under a
purely subjective approach: every belief would be reasonable because there would be no
external source by which to measure reasonableness (except perhaps the reviewing judges’
own subjective beliefs). See Pardo, supra note 11, at 591.
246. For example, suppose six jurors think the defendant committed one burglary, and the
other six think he committed a different burglary. To know the probability that the defendant
committed either burglary, the jury would have to know the probabilities for all the other
activities the defendant could have been doing at those times other than burglary.
247. We could generalize from the burglary example in the previous note and imagine the
jury comparing two probabilities: (1) the combined probabilities for all the possible states of
the world in which the defendant committed a crime, and (2) the combined probabilities for
all the possible states in which he did not.

2015]

GROUP AGENCY AND LEGAL PROOF

1855

compelling than those above to justify such large-scale and radical
revisions to our current practices.248
B. Inconsistent Criminal Verdicts
The second potential counterargument challenges the analysis on
descriptive grounds. According to this argument, the fact that
inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases are allowable, as a matter of
constitutional doctrine,249 poses a challenge to the explanatory
account and a non-summative view of the jury. The fact that
inconsistent verdicts are acceptable, in other words, may indicate
that jurors need not agree on any particular explanation (disjunctive
or not) or form a coherent group judgment at all—verdicts are
simply the aggregation of individual votes on the elements and
nothing more. Juries are a “they,” in other words, and not an “it.”250
A closer examination of the reasons for this doctrine, however,
reveals that it does not pose a challenge to the explanatory account
or a non-summative view of the jury. First, it is important to note
that consistency is a recognized requirement in civil cases, and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize and instruct judges to
read verdicts and interrogatories in a manner that preserves consistency, if possible.251 In criminal cases, moreover, the Supreme
Court’s acquiescence in inconsistent verdicts does not follow from
indifference to consistency. In the primary modern case on the issue,
the Court examined a situation in which a defendant had been
convicted of a federal statute criminalizing the use of the telephone
248. See Allen & Stein, supra note 14, at 602 (“[W]hen one proposes to redesign a foundational element of the legal system, the person bears a heavy burden of proof to show the
system is malfunctioning.... [T]he presumption should be that a system that has been in use
for so long and that underwent multiple adjustments and refinements does not have serious
operational and conceptual flaws.”).
249. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390,
393 (1932).
250. Agency, for both individuals and groups, requires some minimal degree of rationality,
of which some minimal degree of consistency is a key component. See DONALD DAVIDSON, A
Unified Theory of Thought, Meaning, and Action, in PROBLEMS OF RATIONALITY 157 (2004)
(discussing the importance of consistency for interpretation); LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at
24 (“Achieving consistency is of special importance.... Let an agent try to act on inconsistent
representations or motivations, or let others try to orientate by the ascription of such
attitudes, and there will be a straightforward breakdown.”).
251. FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
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to facilitate sales of illegal narcotics,252 while also being acquitted of
some of the underlying conduct that formed the predicate for the
telephone-facilitation charges.253 In short, the jury found the defendant guilty of using the telephone to sell drugs, while acquitting her
of selling drugs.254 The Court allowed the inconsistency to stand—
but not because it denied the importance of consistency or potential
problems with inconsistency.255 Rather, the Court acquiesced in the
inconsistency because of fairness considerations and the traditional
role of jury nullification: “The fact that the inconsistency may be the
result of lenity, coupled with the Government’s inability to invoke
review, suggests that inconsistent verdicts should not be reviewable.”256 In other words, the Court recognized that the jury may, as
a group, apply the “beyond a reasonable doubt” rule consistently (in
accord with the explanatory conception), and then grant leniency to
a defendant.257 It is the preservation of this option, and not anything
about inconsistency qua inconsistency, that explains the doctrine.
The Court’s reasoning on this issue has been subjected to criticism,258 but this issue is outside the scope of this Article. The key
point is that the line of cases and doctrine on inconsistent criminal
verdicts neither poses a challenge to the explanatory conception of
proof nor the non-summative conception of juries.

252. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2012).
253. Powell, 469 U.S. at 60.
254. Id. at 59-60.
255. Id. at 65 (“Inconsistent verdicts therefore present a situation where ‘error,’ in the
sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred, but
it is unclear whose ox has been gored.” (emphasis added)); id. at 67 (“[W]e note that a criminal
defendant already is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent
review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts.”
(emphasis added)).
256. Id. at 66. The Court relied on Justice Holmes’s opinion in Dunn v. United States,
which likewise rejected inconsistency as a requirement for verdicts because of the possibility
of lenity. 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932).
257. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 67-68.
258. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 213 (1989); Eric L.
Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 771, 794 (1998).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has defended a view of the jury as a group epistemic
agent, with properties and characteristics of agency that may differ
from the agency of its members. This conception of the jury avoids
two extremes. The first, recognized (and rejected) by (then Assistant
Professor now Justice) Ruth Bader Ginsburg, sees the jury as “a
singular body—twelve men who, through the alchemy of the deliberative process, become as one.”259 The second extreme denies the
existence of jury agency, positing that the jury is nothing other than
individual jurors and their conflicting beliefs, desires, and preferences. The “jury,” under this view, is nothing but a fiction, shorthand for the loose collection of individual juror votes about whether
the formal elements of a crime, claim, or defense have been
proven.260 The conception of the jury presented in this Article rejects
both the mystical harmony of the first view and the austere
skepticism of the second. It recognizes that juries may act as group
agents not because of anything mysterious, but rather because of
the process by which individual judgments are aggregated. Sometimes—because of the applicable aggregation function—juries will
display properties and characteristics of agency that deviate from
the properties and characteristics of all or most members.
What benefits follow from adopting this conception of juries? As
with group agency generally, recognizing groups at this level allows
us to better understand the nature of these important groups, to
better predict how they will behave, and to better appreciate how
changes and interventions will affect them. In short, we will not fail
to see the forest for the trees.261 Turning to the group-level perspective reveals a number of conceptual problems for a probabilistic
conception of legal evidence and proof. The explanatory conception
of evidence and proof, by contrast, alleviates these problems and
259. Ruth B. Ginsburg, Special Findings and Jury Unanimity in the Federal Courts, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 256, 268 (1965). This view resembles those of the emergentist tradition. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
260. This view accords with the eliminativist tradition and is consistent with a probabilistic
conception of proof. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
261. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 2, at 76. For a discussion on the rights and responsibilities
of groups qua groups, see id. at 170-85.
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thus the group perspective provides further vindication for this
theoretical account. The group perspective, when coupled with the
explanatory conception, also provides practical insights for doctrinal
problems regarding juror agreement. The explanatory conception
illuminates that jurors must agree on explanations, including the
possibility of disjunctive explanations. Convergence on explanations,
given the applicable aggregation rules—and not through any sort of
alchemy—is how the jury carries out its responsibility of speaking
with “one voice” on behalf of and to the community.262
The jury is one of many important groups within the law. The
analysis in this Article may carry additional implications for other
legal groups. These implications may be both general and specific.
As a general matter, recognizing the jury as a group agent may
make the agency of other legal groups easier to appreciate and thus
serve as a corrective for some of the austere skepticism about group
agency pervading pockets of legal scholarship (while also avoiding
the mysticism at the other extreme). More specifically, the jury is
not the only epistemic agent in the law—courts, agencies, and several other collective bodies also make epistemic judgments about
whether certain conclusions are warranted or not, given the available evidence (and applicable legal standards).263 As with legal
proof, the explanatory conception may provide important insight for
understanding these epistemic practices, as it does throughout the
sciences.264

262. See Leib et al., supra note 98, at 1132 (arguing that juries are fiduciaries for the
community); see also Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 25, at 252 (discussing the “integrity”
of group judgments); List & Pettit, supra note 28, at 385 (discussing group judgments); Jason
Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, at 1335 (2012) (discussing
the political roles of the jury, including bringing community norms into the process); Westen
& Ow, supra note 12, at 180 (discussing group judgments).
263. See Allen & Pardo, supra note 66, at 1798 (explaining the epistemological similarities
between legal and factual questions); Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication,
and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
939, 941 (2011) (arguing that the framework for court review of administrative agencies is
based on a law-fact, judge-jury model).
264. See CARL F. CRAVER, EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE MOSAIC UNITY OF
NEUROSCIENCE 21-62 (2007) (discussing different models of explanation in science).

